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Abstract
The three chapters in this dissertation constitute an investigation of the deter-
minants of idiosyncratic income risk faced by individuals and households over
their lives and over time, as well as the consequences for individual behavior and
welfare. Chapter 1 concentrates on the business-cycle variation in higher-order
income risk and the extent to which such risk can be smoothed within house-
holds or with government social insurance policies. Chapter 2 studies the role
of labor market institutions and employment protection in shaping individuals’
exposure to earnings uncertainty over their lives. Chapter 3 measures the re-
sponse of household consumption to large and unexpected earnings fluctuations
that neither labor market institutions nor government policy can insure away.
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Chapter 1
Business Cycle Earnings Risk
and Government Insurance
1
21.1 Introduction
This paper studies how higher-order income risk varies over the business cycle
as well as the extent to which such risks can be smoothed within households
or with government social insurance policies. By higher-order income risk, we
refer to risks that are captured by not only the variance of income shocks, but
also their skewness and kurtosis. These higher order moments of the data can
be a major source of risk for individuals as we show in this paper.
To provide a broad perspective on these questions, we study panel data on
individuals and households from the United States, Germany, and Sweden, cov-
ering more than three decades of data for each country. It is useful to begin by
putting our analysis in context. A broad range of empirical evidence indicates
that idiosyncratic income risk rises in recessions. Earlier work in the literature
was limited by the small sample size and time span on the available survey-based
panel datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), forcing re-
searchers to make parametric assumptions to obtain identification. One widely
used assumptions that is common in the literature is that shocks to earnings are
Gaussian and, therefore, its changes are bound to be symmetric. Restricting at-
tention to the changes in the mean and variance of income shocks, earlier studies
concluded that the variance of income shocks is countercyclical (e.g., Storeslet-
ten et al. (2004)). In recent work, Guvenen et al. (2014) used a very large
panel dataset on earnings histories of a representative sample of 10% of all US
working-age males from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) records.
Their large sample size, with millions of observations, allows for identification of
changes in an unrestricted sense—without parametric assumptions.They found
that the variance of income shocks is very stable over time and is robustly acycli-
cal, whereas the skewness of shocks varies significantly over time in a procyclical
fashion. This suggests that the changes in labor income risks in recessions and
expansions are rather asymmetric.
Despite important advantages, the SSA data also have three shortcomings:
3(i) earnings data are available only for individuals, and it is not possible to link
household members to each other, (ii) no information is available on taxes and
transfers (unemployment insurance, welfare payments, gifts, etc.), and (iii) no
information is available on skills/education. Furthermore, Guvenen et al. (2014)
focus on males with no corresponding information on women.
This paper makes two contributions. First, applying non-parametric tech-
niques and using robust statistics, we document that the overall dispersion of in-
dividual labor earnings growth is flat and acyclical in all three countries, whereas
the left-skewness of shocks is strongly countercyclical. These findings are robust
across gender, skill groups, private/public sector employment and occupation.
Furthermore, we show (using data for Germany) that these results are primarily
driven by changes in wages and not in hours. Moreover, we show that applying
the same method to both survey and administrative data (the PSID and SSA
for the U.S. and SOEP and SIAB for Germany) yields the same substantive
conclusions.
Second we find that insurance provided within households or by the gov-
ernment plays an important role in reducing downside risk, but that how and
to what extent differs between the countries. Within-household provided insur-
ance reduces the countercyclicality in the skewness of earnings in Sweden, but
evidence of within-household insurance is much weaker in United States and in
Germany. Government provided insurance, in the form of unemployment insur-
ance, welfare benefits, aid to low income households, and the like, plays a more
important role in all three countries; the effectiveness is weakest in the United
States, and strongest in Germany.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data
sources, and Section 1.3 describes the empirical approach. Section 1.4 presents
the results for gross (before-government) individual earnings and examines how
the patterns of cyclicality vary by gender, education, and type of employment.
Section 1.5 expands the analysis to households and includes various types of
4government social insurance policies to examine their impact on the cyclicality
of higher-order risk. Section ?? uses a structural life-cycle consumption-savings
model with partial insurance to quantify the welfare benefits of governments’
social insurance policies in the three countries under study. Section 1.6 con-
cludes.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is primarily related to two streams of the literature: the inves-
tigation of the cyclical properties of income risk and the design and analysis of
government policy over the business cycle.
The question of how idiosyncratic income risk varies over the business cycle is
essentially empirical, yet its answers have been dominated by parametric choices
as a way to overcome the data limitations. Storesletten et al. (2004) addressed
those difficulties and proposed an identification strategy that allowed exploiting
a longer time span compared to that available in the micro data. Similar to our
results, they find that income risk increases in recessions. However, as discussed
in the introduction, they find this risk to be driven by countercyclical variance.
Our paper is closer to Guvenen et al. (2014), also briefly discussed above, both
in our non-parametric methods and in the findings. We also find the increase in
income risk to be driven by higher-order moments. Moreover, compared to the
latter paper, we extend the empirical analysis to different samples, demographic
groups, income measures, and countries. We, together with contemporaneous
research discussed below, confirm that the increase in downside risk in recessions
is a pervasive phenomenon.
Despite the importance of this empirical question for policy analysis in gen-
eral, there are few applications to countries other than the US. A notable excep-
tion is ?, who extend the framework in Storesletten et al. (2004) and apply it
to household data in Germany, the UK, and the US. Limiting their analysis to
5symmetric business-cycle risk of wages, they find mixed evidence for the cycli-
cality of the variance of shocks; namely that variance is procyclical in Germany,
acyclical in the UK, and countercyclical in the US. They attribute this result
to the differences in institutions between the three economies. In our paper,
we compare three economies with very different institutions, and after allowing
for the possibility of asymmetric changes find that all three countries exhibit
similar cyclical patterns in higher-order labor income risk. Closer to our work,
? analyze the cyclicality of labor income risk in Germany, explicitly allowing
for time variation of the skewness. Extending the identification approach of
Storesletten et al. (2004) to the third moment, they come to the same substan-
tial conclusion as we do; namely, that variation of income risk over the business
cycle is asymmetric. Finally, ?
Our focus on higher-order moments, in addition to the recent empirical ev-
idence, is motivated by a number of theoretical and quantitative papers that
highlight the importance of these for household consumption behavior to be
empirically plausible. In particular, Constantinides and Ghosh (2014) allow la-
bor income shocks to exhibit procyclical skewness in an asset-pricing model.
Their model is able to match the cross-sectional distribution of market returns,
resolving several puzzles in the finance literature, including the equity premium
and excess volatility puzzles. These results are in line with earlier theoretical
results shown in Mankiw (1986).
This paper is also related to the literature on economic stabilizers and cycli-
cal government policy. Similar to our work, ? focus on the stabilization power
of taxes and transfers. Their model allows for different channels through which
fiscal policy can interact with the business cycle. Our exercise is related to their
social insurance channel; that is, how these policies alter the risks households
are exposed to and their subsequent consumption response. In line with our
results, they find that transfers and taxes help reduce the welfare costs of reces-
sions. ? study the design of optimal policy—transfers, taxes, and government
6debt---in response to aggregate shocks in a model with incomplete markets and
redistribution concerns. They calibrate the model to US data, capturing the
asymmetric variation in the tails of the distribution of earnings shocks. They
find that it is optimal for the government to increase all three instruments as a
hedging device against aggregate shocks.
1.2 The Data
This section provides an overview of the data sets we use in our empirical analy-
sis, the sample selection criteria, as well as the variables used in the subsequent
empirical analyses. Given the diversity of our data sources, we relegate the
details to Appendix A. Briefly, we employ four longitudinal data sets corre-
sponding to three different countries: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for the United States, covering 1976 to 2010;1 the Sample of Integrated
Labour Market Biographies (SIAB2) and the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) for Germany, covering 1976 to 2010 and 1984 to 2011, respectively;
and the Longitudinal Individual Data Base (LINDA) for Sweden, covering 1979
to 2010. The PSID and the SOEP are survey-based data sets. The PSID has
a yearly sample of approximately 2000 households in the core sample, which
is representative of the U.S. population; the SOEP started with about 10,000
individuals (or 5,000 households) in 1984 and, after several refreshments, covers
about 18,000 individuals (10,500 households) in 2011.3
The SIAB is based on administrative social security records and our initial
sample covers on average 370,000 individuals per year. It excludes civil servants,
students and self-employed, which make about 20% of the workforce. From the
1The PSID contains information since 1967. We choose our benchmark sample to start in
1976 due to the poor coverage of income transfers before the 1977 wave. We complement our
results using a longer period whenever possible and pertinent.
2We use the factually anonymous scientific use file SIAB-R7510, which is a 2% draw from
the Integrated Employment Biographies data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
3These numbers refer to observations after cleaning but before sample selection. Only the
representative SRC sample is considered in the PSID. The immigrant sample and high income
sample of the SOEP are not used, because they cover only sub-periods.
7perspective of our analysis, the SIAB has two caveats: (i) income is top-coded at
the limit of income subject to social security contributions, and (ii) individuals
cannot be linked to each other, which prohibits identification of households. We
deal with (i) by fitting a Pareto distribution to the upper tail of the wage distri-
bution4 and with (ii) by using data from SOEP for all household-level analyses.
Throughout the analysis we focus on West Germany, which for simplicity we
refer to as Germany. LINDA is compiled from administrative sources (the In-
come Register) and tracks a representative sample with approximately 300,000
individuals per year.
For each country, we consider three samples: two at the individual level–one
for males and one for females–and one at the household level. The samples are
constructed as revolving panels: for a given statistic computed based on the
time difference between years t and t + k, the panel contains individuals who
are aged 25 to 59 in periods t and t + k (k = 1 or 5) and have yearly labor
earnings above a minimum threshold in both years. This threshold is defined as
the earnings level that corresponds to 520 hours of employment at half the legal
minimum wage, which is about $1885 US dollars for the United States in 2010.5
To avoid possible outliers, we exclude the top 1% of earnings observations in the
PSID and SOEP, but not in LINDA (which is from administrative sources). For
each individual, we record age, gender, education, and gross labor earnings. By
gross earnings we mean a worker’s compensation from his/her employer before
any kind of government intervention in the form of taxes or transfers.
The household sample is constructed by imposing the same criteria on the
4The imputation is done separately for each year by subgroups defined by age and gender.
For workers with imputed wages, across years, we preserve the relative ranking within the
age specific cross-sectional wage distribution. The procedure follows Daly et al. (2014): see
Appendix A.1.3 for details.
5For the United States, we use the federal minimum wage. There is no official minimum
wage in Sweden or Germany during this period. For Germany, we a take a minimum threshold
of 3 Euros (in year 2000 Euros) for the hourly wage. For Sweden, the effective hourly minimum
wage via labor market agreements was around SEK 75 in 2004 (Skedinger, 2007). For other
years, we adjust the minimum wage by calculating the mean real earnings for each year,
estimating a linear time trend for these means and removing that time trend from the SEK
75 minimum wage.
8household head and adding specific requirements at the household level. More
specifically, a household is included in our sample if it has at least two adult
members, one of them being the household head,6 that satisfy the age criterion
and household income that satisfies the income criteria. At the household level,
we will analyze pre- and post government earnings and disposable income. Pre-
government earnings defined as the sum of gross labor earnings earned by the
adults in the household. Post-government earnings is constructed by adding
taxes and transfers, and disposable income by in addition adding capital income.
Classifying Expansions and Recessions
For the United States, the classification of expansionary and recessionary episodes
is based on the NBER peak and trough dates, with small timing variations.
Given the time span covered by our sample, we classify the following years as
recessions: 1980-1983, 1991-92, 2001-2002, and 2008-2010. The main difference
compared to the NBER list is that we treat the 1980-1983 period as a single
“double-dip” recession because of the short duration of the intervening expansion
and the lack of recovery in the unemployment rate. Based on this classification,
there are four expansions and four recessions during our sample period.
6In PSID and SOEP the head of a household is defined within the data set. In LINDA,
the head of a household is defined as the sampled male.
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Figure 1.1: Cyclical Component of Quarterly GPD Growth: U.S., Germany,
and Sweden
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Note: The shaded areas in the figure indicate U.S. recessions according to our classification
described in the text. The series for Germany corresponds to West Germany up to and
including 1990Q4, and to (Unified) Germany from 1991Q1 on. The cyclical component is
obtained by HP-filtering the series for GDP per capita from 1970Q1 to 2014Q1.
For both Germany and Sweden, we base the dating of expansions and re-
cessions on data from the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), which
applies the NBER methodology to OECD countries since 1948. The classifica-
tion is consistent with various aggregate measures of the German and Swedish
economies, respectively. In the time period covered by the panel data, recession
periods for Germany (peak to trough) are from January 1980 to October 1982,
January 1991 to April 1994, January 2001 to August 2003, and April 2008 to
January 2009. Our sample period hence covers four recessions and four expan-
sions. For Sweden, ECRI recession periods are from February 1980 to June
1983, June 1990 to July 1993, and April 2008 to March 2009. This leaves us
with three recessions and three expansions during our sample period.
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1.3 Empirical Approach
Measuring Income Volatility over the Business Cycle
For each year, we calculate robust statistics of log s-year changes in income. We
consider different choices of s in order to distinguish between earnings growth
over short and long horizons, and interpret these as corresponding to “transitory”
and “persistent” earnings shocks.
More specifically, we compute moments m [∆syt], where yt ≡ lnYt (natural
logarithm) and ∆syt ≡ yt − yt−s. The moments m we consider are: the log dif-
ferential between the 90th and 10th percentiles (L9010), the (Kelley) skewness,
and the top (L9050) and bottom (L5010) tails. For Germany and Sweden, s
refers to 1- and 5-year changes. Due to the biennial structure of the PSID from
the 1997 wave, our analyses of earnings for the United States refer to 2- and
4-year changes instead.7
We do not impose any parametric assumption on the dynamics of income but
instead analyze the behavior of the tails of the distribution of earnings changes.
We think this is important since interpretations when using the variance as a
summary statistic of the distribution alone can be misleading. To see this point,
consider a widening of both the upper and lower tails of a normally distributed
variable. This is, P90 is shifted to the right and P10 is shifted to the left.
This certainly implies an increase in the variance; the opposite, however, is not
necessarily true. Think of the case in which only the lower tail shifts to the left.
Notice how the overall dispersion of the distribution increases here as well, but
if we were to interpret this increase in isolation we would wrongfully conclude
that not only one tail, but both of them expand. Similarly, unchanged overall
dispersion does not imply an unchanged distribution, but can be observed when
both tails move together (i.e., one tail shrinks while the other expands). Both of
these last two scenarios imply a change of the relative size of the tails–a feature
7We calculate overlapping s-year differences up to ∆sy1996, and non-overlapping s-year
differences from then and up to ∆sy2010, for s = 2, 4.
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summarized by the skewness of the distribution. In our empirical analysis, these
are the two scenarios we observe when considering cyclicality: either overall
dispersion does not change while skewness does, or dispersion is cyclical, caused
by one tail expanding and the other shrinking.
We conclude that, when measuring income volatility, the tails should be
explicitly analyzed. Furthermore, when relying on summary statistics of the
distribution, limiting the analysis to the variance cannot possibly identify the
nature of the change, yielding misleading results. Higher-order moments, like
skewness, should be then considered. Note how any assumption on the distri-
bution of income shocks would drive our results: a (log-) normal distribution
cannot capture changes in skewness, for example. This is why, and in light
of recent evidence on male earnings growth using administrative data for the
United States (Guvenen et al., 2014), we take a skeptical–non parametric–point
of view.
Broadening the Definition of Business Cycles
Some of the important macroeconomic variables do not perfectly synchronize
with expansions and recessions, but their fluctuations might have an impact on
earnings. For example, the U.S. stock market experienced a significant drop in
1987, during an expansion, and we can see in the time series analysis how the
third moment falls sharply in that year. Similarly, the U.S. economy displayed
an overall weakness in 1993-1994, which is evident in a range of economic vari-
ables, but these years are technically classified as part of an expansion by the
NBER dating committee. Other examples are easy to find for Germany and
Sweden (e.g., 1996). Therefore, the main focus of our analysis will be on the
co-movement of higher-order moments of earnings changes with a continuous
measure of business cycles. We use the (natural) log growth rate of GDP—i.e.,
∆sGDPt ≡ ln(GDP t)− ln(GDP t−s)—as our measure of aggregate fluctuations.
More specifically, we regress each moment m of the log income change between
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t− s and t on a constant, a linear time trend, and the log growth rate of GDP
between year t− s and t :
m (∆syt) = α+ γt+ β
m ×∆s(GDPt) + ut. (1.1)
For a quantitative interpretation of the results reported in the next sections,
Table I reports the short- and long-run volatility of GDP growth for each country
and year sample considered along the paper.
Table I: Short- and Long-Run GDP Growth Volatility: United States, Germany,
and Sweden
Std. Dev. of GDP Growth
Data period short-run long-run
United States 1976-2010 3.34% 4.44%
Germany 1976-2010 2.01% 3.95%
Sweden 1976-2010 2.36% 5.42%
Note: Short-run is 1-year difference for Germany and Sweden, and 2-year dif-
ference for the United States. Long-run is 5-year difference for Germany and
Sweden and 4-year difference for the United States.
1.4 Empirical Results: Gross Individual Earnings
In this section, we address four questions concerning higher-order risk for indi-
vidual earnings. First, we ask if the countercyclical skewness and the acyclical
dispersion is a US-only phenomenon or a robust feature of business cycles that
can be observed in other countries whose labor markets differ greatly from that
in the U.S.. For example, according to OECD (1993) 15 percent of U.S work-
ers are unionized and 21 percent are covered by trade union agreements. In
Germany the equivalent shares are somewhat higher; 30 and 44 percent respec-
tively, but in Sweden the overwhelming majority are members (84 percent) or
are covered (94 percent) by trade union agreements. Second, we ask if business
cycle variation in higher-order income risk differs across observationally distinct
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groups, defined by gender, education, private/public sector employment and
occupation. Third, we ask if cyclicality of earnings changes can be attributed
mainly to changes in wages or to changes in hours worked. Fourth, we ask if
the countercyclicality of skewness and the acyclicality of dispersion found in
U.S. administrative earnings data is also borne out in U.S. survey data, e.g., the
PSID. This question is important because earlier papers that used the PSID and
adopted parametric methods found strongly countercyclical variance of shocks.
This begs the question: is it the data set or is it the methodology that accounts
for these different conclusions?
Table II: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
Males –0.11 1.67*** 0.57*** –0.68***
(–0.51) (5.00) (3.71) (–3.96)
Females 0.40*** 0.62* 0.48** –0.08
(1.85) (1.97) (2.61) (–0.52)
Sweden
Males –0.11 3.74*** 0.91*** –1.01***
(–1.22) (4.00) (3.80) (–3.74)
Females 0.43** 1.64*** 0.67*** –0.24**
(2.24) (3.33) (3.09) (–2.67)
Germany (SIAB)
Males 0.15 5.48*** 0.95*** –0.80***
(0.36) (5.80) (3.14) (–4.11)
Females 0.34 2.55** 0.80 –0.46*
(0.48) (2.05) (1.25) (–1.80)
Note: Each cell reports the coefficient on log GDP change of a regression of a moment of
the distribution of changes in a income measure on log GDP change, a constant, and a linear
time trend. Newey-West t-statistics are included in parentheses (maximum lag length
considered: 3 for SIAB and LINDA, 2 for PSID). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗) denote significance
at the (10%, 5%, 1%)-level.
Cyclicality of Dispersion
In Table II, we report the cyclicality of four key statistics computed from the
distribution of earnings changes of individual workers. To provide a comparative
discussion, we report the results for all three countries in the same table. For
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now, we focus on the first row of each panel, corresponding to the sample of
male workers in each country. The first column reports the cyclicality of the
L9010. In the United States, the L9010 for males is acyclical, as seen from the
small (–0.11) and statistically insignificant (t-stat of –0.51) coefficient. Turning
to Sweden and Germany, the L9010 for male earnings are also acyclical.8
8All regression results based on SIAB data are robust to various robustness checks that
address issues of top-coding and a structural break in the wage variable. See appendix ?? for
details.
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Figure 1.2: Standard Deviation, Skewness, and Tails of Short-Run Earnings
Growth: United States, Sweden, and Germany (SIAB): All Males
(a) United States, SD (left) and KS (right)
(b) United States, Upper and Lower Tail
(c) Sweden, SD (left) and KS (right) (d) Sweden, Upper and Lower Tail
(e) Germany, SD (left) and KS (right) (f) Germany, Upper and Lower Tail
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
Overall, we conclude that in all three countries the dispersion of earnings
changes does not display any robust pattern of cyclicality, judging from these
regressions. In addition to being acyclical, the dispersion of earnings changes is
quite flat over time (left panels of Figure 1.2). These figures should be compared
with typical calibrations in the literature that assume the volatility of earning
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shocks doubles or triples during recessions. Here the largest movements are on
the order of 10% to 15%, and they show no signs of cyclicality.
Cyclicality of Skewness
We next turn to the cyclical behavior of skewness. Column 2 reports a measure
of asymmetry, called Kelley’s skewness, defined as:
Sk = (P90− P50)− (P50− P10)
(P90− P10) .
This measure has several attractive features compared with the third standard-
ized moment. First, it is much less sensitive to extreme observations, since it
does not depend on observations beyond the 90th and 10th percentiles of the
distribution. This deals with the concern about potential outliers. It is there-
fore our preferred measure of skewness, especially when considering the U.S.
and Germany (GSOEP) where measurement issues could be more important.9
Second, the particular value of Kelley’s skewness has a simple interpretation, in
terms of the relative lengths of the top and bottom tails. In particular,
P90− P50
P90− P10 = 0.5 +
Sk
2
, (1.2)
which can be used to compute the fraction of overall dispersion (P90-P10) that
is accounted for by the top tail (P90-50) and consequently by the bottom tail
(P50-P10).
Armed with these definitions, we turn to the left panels of Figure 1.2. In
all three countries, Kelley’s skewness is procyclical. This pattern is particularly
striking in Sweden and Germany, where movements in Kelley’s skewness are
almost perfectly synchronized with the business cycle as defined by ECRI. The
notable exception is the fall in Kelley’s skewness in 1996, but note that the
cyclical component of GDP did indeed fall in 1996 as displayed in Figure 1.1.
9We have also analyzed the third standardized moment, and found very similar results.
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Furthermore, Table II shows that the procyclicality of Kelley’s skewness is (sta-
tistically) significant at the 1% level in all three countries. The coefficient is 1.67
for the U.S., 3.74 for Sweden, and 5.48 for Germany, showing more cyclicality
when moving from the U.S. to Sweden and most for Germany. Thus, for exam-
ple, if a typical recession in Sweden entails a drop in GDP growth of two standard
deviations (from +1 to −1 sigmas, for a swing of 2× 0.0236 = 0.0472), Kelley’s
skewness will fall by 0.0472× 3.74 = 0.177. For the sake of discussion, suppose
Sexp.k = 0 in an expansion, then Srec.k = −0.18, which in turn implies from equa-
tion (1.2) that the upper tail to lower tail ratio, (P90−P50)/(P50−P10) goes
from 50/50 to 41/59 from an expansion to a recession. This is a large change in
the relative size of each tail, especially for a country like Sweden, which might be
thought of as displaying lower business cycle risk (due to the high unionization
rate, among others).10
Inspecting the Tails
At the expense of some oversimplification, it might be useful to think about a
shift towards more negative skewness as arising from either a compression of the
right tail or an expansion of the left tail or both. Thus, a follow-up question is:
which one of these changes is driving the cyclical changes in skewness for each
country? Again, the pattern is particularly striking in Sweden, see the middle
right panel of 1.2. It shows that the top tail is procyclical, whereas the bottom
tail is countercyclical. The last two columns of Table II shows that this pattern
is present and (statistically) significant in all three countries. This means that,
in a recession, the positive half of the shock distribution compresses relative to
the median, whereas the negative half expands. Thus, the shift towards negative
skewness happens through both tails moving in unison during recessions.
Furthermore, notice that for all three countries it turns out that the mag-
nitude of movement of each tail is similar to each other. For example, for the
10The corresponding changes in Sk for the U.S. and Germany are: 0.11 and 0.22 respec-
tively.
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U.S., the coefficient for L9050 is 0.57 and for L5010 is –0.68. The corresponding
coefficients are 0.91 and –1.01 for Sweden, and 0.95 and –0.80 for Germany.
Therefore, as log GDP growth fluctuates over the business cycle, the shrink-
ing of one tail is matched closely by the expansion of the other tail, making
the total dispersion, the L9010, move very little over the cycle. As a result,
skewness becomes more negative in recessions without any significant change
in the variance. This analysis shows that the behavior of higher-order risk is
best understood by separately studying the top and bottom tails over the cycle,
which can move together or independently. Focusing simply on a directionless
moment, such as the L9010 or the variance, can miss important asymmetries
that can matter for the nature of earnings risk. As we will see in a moment,
whenever we observe cyclical dispersion, it is driven by asymmetric movements
of the tails, and should not be thought of as a pure change in L9010 or the
variance (which would imply an expansion/compression of both tails).
Survey vs. Administrative data
The earlier work on higher order income risk for male earnings, Guvenen et al.
(2014), used administrative data from the U.S. Social Security Administration
(SSA) records. As mentioned in the introduction, it lacks information on income
components beyond earnings and one cannot link household members to each
other. Similar restrictions apply to the administrative data we use for Germany
(SIAB). This is why we use survey data (PSID for the U.S. and SOEP for
Germany) to answer questions regarding insurance provided within households
and by the government. These data sets however suffer from having fairly few
observations, which may imply that higher moments are imprecisely estimated.
Reassuringly however, the results for individual earnings are very similar in
PSID and SSA data, and in SIAB and SOEP data respectively. Specifically,
we have re-run regression 1.1 using moments from the SSA data, as reported
in Guvenen et al. (2014), and from SOEP data. The resulting coefficients for
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U.S. males using SSA data for each of the four moments are –0.07 , 2.31***
, 1.02*** , and –1.09**, respectively. These numbers are strikingly similar to
those in the first row of the top panel in Table II The equivalent numbers using
SOEP data are –1.33**, 1.76***, –0.21, and –1.12***. While these numbers
differ somewhat from those in the first row of the bottom panel in Table II,
they tell the same story. In particular, male earnings changes in both SOEP and
SIAB is characterized by asymmetric movements of the tails rather than uniform
expansions and contractions of both tails.11 The bottom tail is countercyclical
in both data sets while the top tail is procyclical in SIAB but acyclical in SOEP.
As a result, the L9010 is acyclical in SIAB and countercyclical in SOEP, but in
both data sets skewness is procyclical.
1.4.1 Differences by Gender
We now turn to the cyclicality of higher-order risk for female workers and ex-
amine how they compare to the patterns for males. Focusing on the second
row of each panel in Table II, we see three main patterns. First, the L9010 of
earnings changes is procyclical for U.S. and Swedish women but acyclical for
German women. This is different from men, who displayed acyclical dispersion
in all countries. Second, Kelley’s measure of skewness is always procyclical–left-
skewness is countercyclical–as indicated by the positive coefficient on log GDP
growth, which is highly significant for Sweden (1% level), significant for Ger-
many (5% level), and only slightly significant for the U.S. (10% level).
Third, inspecting the top and bottom tails separately (last two columns), we
observe the expected pattern of cyclicality, whenever the coefficient is significant.
In particular, L9050 is procyclical and significant for the U.S. and Sweden,
whereas the L5010 is countercyclical and significant for Sweden and Germany.12
11We have also run 1.1 using the standard deviation of earnings changes as our measure
for overall dispersion instead, and the coefficients are small (0.07 (SIAB), –0.12 (SOEP)) and
insignificant (t-stat of 0.42 (SIAB), –054 (SOEP)) in both data sets.
12It is somewhat surprising that women in the U.S. seem to face less downside risk as
measured by the L5010 differential compared with these two European countries.
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Thus, just as for the case of male workers, the behavior of the variance is driven
by an asymmetric movement of the two tails rather than a uniform expansion of
both tails. In our view, this finding reiterates our earlier point that the L9010
or the variance are not ideal statistics to focus on when it comes to measuring
higher-order earnings risk over the business cycle. Finally, it is worth noting
that the magnitudes of the fluctuations in both Kelley’s skewness and in the
upper and lower tails separately are somewhat attenuated for women compared
with men.
1.4.2 Differences across groups of workers
To shed light on the possible sources of cyclicality of higher-order income risk
we now examine if it differs across observationally distinct groups. First we
divide male and female workers into groups by education (college vs non-college
graduates), or by private and public employment. These are two dimensions by
which the three countries differ greatly. In Germany. 12 percent of men and
8 percent of women are college educated. In Sweden and the U.S. the equiv-
alent numbers are 16 and 25 for males and 17 and 25 for females respectively.
Differences in the size of public sector employment is even larger. Defining the
public employment public administration, health care and education (sectors
which in Germany and Sweden are dominated by public sector jobs or by jobs
funded by the public),13 the share of public sector employment in Sweden is
more than twice as large as in Germany or the U.S.14 Moreover, public sector
jobs are often thought of as less risky, offering generous employment protection
and less volatile compensation, so it is interesting to ask if this is borne out in
the data.
13Formally we define a worker as working in the public sector, if he/she works in these
sectors in both years t and t + k (where k = 1, 5). Historically most workers in these sectors
were employed by the public; this is less true today.
14In Sweden about 23% of men and 63% of women work in the public sector (these figures
have been relatively stable over the considered time period). In Germany a stable 10% of
men work in the public sector, while the share of women steadily increased from about 23%
to about 36% over the considered time period. In the U.S. 13 percent of males and 18 percent
of females are employed in the public sector.
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For each of these groups we analyze higher order income risk by first comput-
ing average (standardized) moments across years and countries by quartiles of
(standardized) log GDP change as shown in figures 1.3 and 1.4. The standard-
ization of moments and log GDP change is performed independently for each
country before pooling across countries, which implies that a deviation from
zero indicates a standardized deviation from the country-specific mean of the
moment. For each quartile the bars correspond to the average moment for (or-
dered from the left) the full sample (blue), college graduates (green), non-college
graduates (red), private employment (cyan) and public employment (magenta),
respectively. Figure 1.3 shows that earnings risk is very similar across all male
subgroups; overall dispersion is acyclical (upper left panel), Kelley’s skewness is
procyclical (upper right panel), the top tail is procyclical and the bottom tail
is countercyclical. Turning to females, Figure 1.4 shows a similar picture and,
as noted above, that fluctuations in earnings risk is somewhat attenuated for
women. For both males and females we see a strong asymmetric cyclical change
of the distribution of earnings changes across groups.
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Figure 1.3: Average moments by quartiles of log GDP change: Males
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(b) Kelley’s skewness
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(c) P90-50
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(d) P50-10
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Note: For different samples, each bar shows the average moment across years and
countries by quartiles of log GDP change. Both log GDP changes and moments are
standardized by country.
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Figure 1.4: Average moments by quartiles of log GDP change: Females
(a) P90-10
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(b) Kelley’s skewness
Quartile of log gdp change (standardized by country)
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(c) P90-50
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Note: See notes to figure 1.3.
For each group we have also computed correlations between the moments and
log GDP change using equation 1.1 separately by country. These are displayed
in Figure 1.5. Detailed results can be found in Appendix ??. Each panel in the
figure shows, starting from the left, the regression coefficients (from equation
1.1) with confidence intervals for males (solid) in the U.S.(blue), Sweden (red)
and Germany (green), then followed by the equivalent regressions coefficients
for females (dotted). Within each country-gender grouping, the regression coef-
ficients are (ordered from the left) those from the full sample, college graduates,
non-college graduates, private and public employment, respectively.
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Figure 1.5: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings and Wages: United States, Swe-
den, and Germany (SIAB)
(a) P90-10
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for males (-) and females (:)
1 2 3 4 5 ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... ... 1 2 3 4 5
P
oi
n
t
es
ti
m
at
e
an
d
95
%
C
I
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
(b) Kelley’s Skewness
Samples 1-5 for US (blue), Sweden (red), Germany (green)
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(c) P90-50
Samples 1-5 for US (blue), Sweden (red), Germany (green)
for males (-) and females (:)
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(d) P50-10
Samples 1-5 for US (blue), Sweden (red), Germany (green)
for males (-) and females (:)
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Note: The samples are (1) Earnings: full sample , (2) Earnings: college graduates, (3)
Earnings: non-college graduates, (4) Earnings: private sector, (5) Earnings: public sector.
For details of samples see text.
For the regressions, see note to table II. Each • reports reports the coefficient on log GDP
change.
Figure 1.5 confirms the picture that emerged in Figures 1.3 and 1.4; higher
order earnings risk is similar across groups. There are however some noteworthy
differences. The magnitude of cyclicality is stronger for non-college graduates as
compared to college graduates—particularly in the U.S. and Sweden, where it
is about three times stronger. Moreover the magnitude of cyclicality for public
sector workers is weaker in all countries. For example, in Sweden, the procycli-
cality of Kelley’s measure of earnings is lower for the public sector (2.10*** for
males and 1.10*** for females) compared with the private sector (3.83*** for
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males and 1.99*** for females). For males this is due to differences in the top
tail; it compresses strongly for private sector employees, whereas it is acyclical
in the public sector. The L5010 gap on the other hand fluctuates by comparable
magnitudes for both groups. For women, the reduced cyclicality is due to both
tails fluctuating less.
Overall, it is somewhat surprising that, even for workers in the public sector
in a country like Sweden with a reputation for high levels of public insurance,
there is robust evidence of higher downside risk in recessions—compression of the
top and expansion of the bottom—even if the magnitudes are somewhat smaller
than in the private sector. This finding further strengthens the conclusion of this
section that increasing downside earnings risk appears to be a robust feature
of business cycles in developed countries, even with very different labor market
institutions.
Differences Across Occupations
We now turn to occupations and explore the heterogeneity of cyclical earnings
changes along this dimension. We are able to conduct this analysis for Germany;
the SIAB provides time-consistent occupational codes based on the KldB-88,
the 1988 version of the classification of occupations by the German Federal
Employment Agency. We now run the cyclicality regressions separately for each
occupation, where a worker contributes to the earnings changes of occupation j
from t to t+ 1 if in year t he or she works in that occupation.
We first consider the highest level of disaggregation in the KldB-88, which
defines five broad occupational areas; (1) farming, gardening, animal breeding,
fishing, and similar occupations, (2) mining and mineral extraction, (3) manu-
facturing and fabrication, (4) technical occupations like engineering or labora-
tory work, and, (5) service occupations. For each occupation we have computed
correlations between moments and log GDP change using equation 1.1. Detailed
results can be found in Appendix ??. The results are quite similar as compared
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with those for the full sample; in particular for male workers in manufacturing
occupations, technical occupations, and service occupations.
We also consider a more disaggregated analysis and re-run the regressions
for 30 occupational segments. While there are then more variation across oc-
cupations in terms of earnings cyclicality, the general pattern seen in the full
sample of male and female remain; the lower tail is countercyclical for most
occupational segments and the upper tail is mostly procyclical. For both males
and females the tail movements translate into the cyclicality procyclicality of
Kelley’s skewness in the by now familiar way.
Summing up, we find that broad occupational groups experience similar
cyclicality with farming and mining related occupations being less cyclical. Re-
gressions at finer level of disaggregation point towards interesting heterogeneity
of earnings cyclicality across occupations.
1.4.3 Cyclicality of Earnings vs. Wages
A natural question that is raised by these results is whether the observed cycli-
cality of earnings changes can be attributed mainly to changes in wages or to
increased risk of unemployment in economic downturns. The SIAB contains
detailed information on the duration of each employment spell and on whether
it is a part-time or full-time job. Focusing on full-time workers, we analyze
the cyclicality of the distribution of wage changes and compare the results to
the ones on earnings changes. We define a worker as full time if his or her
full-time spells add up to at least 50 weeks of employment in a given year. (A
less strict definition of full-time workers as 45 weeks of employment does not
change the results.) The wage variable is the average daily wage rate, where the
average is taken over all full-time spells. The same measure has also been used
in Dustmann et al. (2009); Card et al. (2013).15
15In Germany, a full-time worker is entitled to an annual vacation time of 4 to 6 weeks,
which is counted as part of the employment spell.
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Table III: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings vs. Wages; Germany (SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Males
Earnings 0.15 5.48*** 0.95*** –0.80***
(0.36) (5.80) (3.14) (–4.11)
Full-Time Wages –0.09 4.73*** 0.30*** –0.39***
(–0.54) (6.31) (3.77) (–3.20)
Full-Time Wages –0.12 4.98*** 0.28*** –0.40***
(Firm Stayers) (–0.81) (5.78) (3.29) (–3.20)
Females
Earnings 0.34 2.55** 0.80 –0.46*
(0.48) (2.05) (1.25) (–1.80)
Full-Time Wages 0.03 2.12*** 0.17** –0.14
(0.18) (5.11) (2.61) (–1.58)
Full-Time Wages 0.02 2.28*** 0.16*** –0.14
(Firm Stayers) (0.13) (4.84) (3.17) (–1.61)
Note: See notes for Table II.
In Table III, rows 1 and 4 reproduce the results from Tables II for complete-
ness. The first set of new results are in rows 2 and 5: these report the cyclical-
ity regressions using average daily wages instead of annual earnings. The main
finding for both males and females is that the cyclicality of wages for full-time
workers are remarkably similar to the cyclicality of earnings. Specifically, both
measures of dispersion of wages are acyclical as was the case for earnings, and
the point estimates for both skewness measures are very close for wages and
earnings.16 Naturally, the dispersion of earnings changes is wider than the dis-
tribution of wage changes, which is reflected by the point estimates on the tails
(last two columns), which are about half as big for wage changes.
A question that remains is what happens to the wages of workers that stay
at the same firm. We therefore further restrict the sample to those workers that
work at least 50 weeks for the same employer in both year t and t+1.17 The
16The sample of full-time female workers contains about 73% of women (who make for only
54% of the observations) that contribute to the measures of earnings change for women. The
corresponding figures were 88% of individuals and 82% of observations for males. This implies
that part-time employment plays a more important role for the female sample.
17The sample of full-time female workers that do not switch firms contains about 61% of
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second set of new results is in rows 3 and 6: the cyclicality regressions for average
daily wages for those workers who work at the same firm. The remarkable result
is that even for those we observe the same qualitative pattern of cyclicality of
wage changes. By and large, these results strongly indicate that the cyclicality
results are driven by changes in wages even for full time workers and not by
hours.
1.5 Introducing Insurance
We now turn to various sources of insurance available in modern economies and
gauge the extent to which they are able to mitigate such downside risk over the
business cycle.
1.5.1 Within-Family Insurance
In the previous section, we have shown that higher-order moments drive indi-
vidual earnings risk over the business cycle. While it is important to understand
the underlying nature of labor income risk and the systematic differences across
groups, most of our samples are composed by individuals in cohabitation.18 As-
suming pooling of resources within the household, the relevant income measure
for many economic decisions is the joint labor income in the household, not in-
dividual income. We therefore shift our attention to joint labor earnings at the
household level in order to shed light on the role of informal insurance mech-
anisms within the household. As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to link
individuals in SIAB, so we rely on SOEP data instead.
women (who make for about 40% of the observations) that contribute to the measures of
earnings change for women. The corresponding figures were 80% of individuals and 65% of
observations for males.
18Only 12% of our benchmark individual sample in the United States lives in a singe-person
household, for example.
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Mixed Evidence of Within-Family Insurance
The first row of each panel in Table IV displays the cyclicality of each moment
of household earnings changes. In order to get a feeling for the decrease (or
increase) of exposure to business cycle fluctuations, we compare these results to
the corresponding measures for individual earnings from Table II and in par-
ticular male earnings as these on average constitute 71, 60, and 62 percent of
household earnings in the United States, Sweden, and Germany, respectively.
Additional evidence comes from the graphical analysis of the dispersion, skew-
ness, and the tails, of male earnings changes and household earnings changes in
Figures 1.6 and 1.7, respectively.
Table IV: Cyclicality of Household Earnings
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
Earnings 0.23 1.97*** 0.93*** –0.71***
(0.74) (6.17) (4.96) (–3.20)
Post-Gov 0.59** 1.17*** 0.72*** –0.14
(2.44) (3.13) (3.42) (–0.86)
Disposable 0.63* 1.13*** 0.74*** –0.12
(1.90) (4.83) (3.75) (–0.65)
Sweden
Earnings –0.02 2.24*** 0.50*** –0.52*
(–0.08) (3.33) (4.94) (–2.00)
Post-Gov –0.41* 0.94** –0.03 –0.38**
(–2.00) (2.38) (–0.44) (–2.33)
Disposable –0.43 1.50*** 0.06 –0.49**
(–1.64) (3.89) (0.61) (–2.67)
Germany (SOEP)
Earnings –1.31*** 1.88** –0.05 –1.26***
(–3.60) (2.68) (–0.18) (–4.26)
Post Gov –0.18 0.66 0.07 –0.25
(–1.09) (0.85) (0.32) (–1.28)
Disposable –0.16 0.56 0.05 –0.22
(–1.11) (0.67) (0.21) (–1.19)
Note: See notes for Table II.
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Considering cyclicality of dispersion, the patterns and magnitudes for house-
hold earnings line up with the ones described for individual male earnings for
all countries: household earnings changes display no cyclicality of dispersion.
This is true especially for Sweden and the United States. The countercyclical
measure of dispersion (as measured by L9010) for Germany is driven by the
lower tail and thus the overall pattern here mirrors the one of male earnings
dispersion in SOEP (see Section 1.4).
The analysis of Kelley’s skewness–and the inspection of the tails–yields very
interesting results when comparing the three countries. In Sweden, intra-family
insurance plays an important role in reducing downside risk over the business
cycle: The estimated coefficients on household earnings are smaller than those
on male earnings and quite close to those on female earning. For example, the
coefficient on Kelley’s skewness is about 2.2 as compared to 3.7 and 1.6 on male
and female earnings respectively. The difference is primarily driven by both
tails reacting less than those for male earnings; the lower tail by about half and
the upper tail by almost as much as compared to male earnings. Repeating the
illustrative calculation from above, this would imply a move from an upper tail
to lower tail ratio of 50/50 in a typical expansion to 45/55 in a recession—much
smaller compared to the change to a ratio of 41/59 for male earnings and very
similar to a ratio of 46/54 for females.
Evidence of within-family insurance is weaker for the United States and
Germany. In both economies, the results suggest somewhat higher downside
risk in recessions for household earnings that that for male earnings, and much
higher risk than that for female earnings. Considering the tails separately for
the two countries, the slightly stronger reaction of Kelley’s skewness is primarily
driven by larger movements in the upper tail in United States, whereas it is the
lower tails that widens more in Germany.
In order to shed further light on the insurance within households, we consider
the cyclicality of income for actual households in comparison to income changes
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for randomly formed couples. This way we want to see if there is anything special
about households visible in the data, or if the dynamics of household income
just represent the dynamics of male and female income. We therefore randomly
pair heads and spouses for each t to t+1 change. For each random couple,
we make sure that artificial income is above the lower income. The first set of
results in each country panel of table ?? shows the bootstrapped mean, standard
deviation and 10-90 confidence band of the regression coefficients. In both the
US and Germany, we find the random couples to experience lower downside risk
than actual households as measured by the cyclicality of L5010. For Sweden,
the random couples’ L5010 shows the same cyclicality as actual households.
The next rows show the same results when not randomly pooling all heads and
spouses, but controlling for some observables on the side of the head. When we
control for age, we group heads into 7 age groups and in the pool of spouses
for each age group are all spouses of heads in the actual data. Finally, we do
the random coupling by age and education groups. As expected, the cyclicality
experienced by random couples is more and more similar to actual households.
Still, for the US and Germany we find actual households experiencing slightly
higher cyclicality of earnings changes than their artificial counterparts. This
suggests that the correlation between head’s and spouse’s labor market income
is higher than for a random counterpart and uncontrolled characteristics play
some role - like, e.g., most heads and spouses working in the same local labor
markets.
We conclude that the responses of gross household earnings are heteroge-
neous across countries, with Sweden being the only economy where the family
plays a clear insurance role against aggregate fluctuations. However, it is hard
to extract further conclusions in disconnection to taxes and transfers payed and
received by the household. In order to shed light on this issue, we move on to
considering the role of social insurance policy over the business cycle.
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Figure 1.6: Standard Deviation (Left) and Skewness (Right) of Short-Run
Earnings Growth: United States, Germany (SOEP), and Sweden
(a) United States, Std. Dev.
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(b) United States, Kelley’s Skewness
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(c) Sweden, Std. Dev.
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(d) Sweden, Kelley’s Skewness
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(e) Germany, Std. Dev.
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(f) Germany, Kelley’s Skewness
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Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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Figure 1.7: Tails of Short-Run Earnings Growth: United States, Germany
(SOEP), and Sweden
(a) United States, P90-50
Year
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
U
p
p
er
T
ai
l
(L
9
05
0)
o
f
2-
Y
ea
r
E
ar
n
in
g
s
G
ro
w
th
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Male Earnings
Household Earnings
Household Post-Gov. Earnings
(b) United States, P50-10
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(c) Sweden, P90-50
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(d) Sweden, P50-10
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(e) Germany, P90-50
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(f) Germany, P50-10
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Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
1.5.2 Government and Social Insurance Policy
Focusing on the household as the relevant unit, we analyze the effectiveness
of social policy in mitigating business cycle risk in addition to any insurance
arrangements made within households. We evaluate the total insurance effect
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of the tax and transfer system by analyzing the cyclicality of post-government
earnings as compared to household gross earnings. In order to gain insights on
the effectiveness of different policies, we then evaluate the relative importance
of several subcomponents of transfers using the empirical tools employed in
the previous analysis on income measures that in turn add certain transfers to
household gross earnings.
For the analysis of subcomponents, we consider three main groups of trans-
fers that are comparable across countries and for each country are consistently
measured over time. The groups are (1) labor-market-related policies, (2) aid
to low-income families, and (3) “pensions,” and are listed in Table V. Labor-
market-related policies mainly consist of unemployment benefit payments—this
component of social insurance policy is of particular importance for the mitiga-
tion of increased downside household earnings risk in recessions, if the nature
of downside risk is (temporary) job loss of household head or spouse.
Table V: Components of Social Policy
LINDA SOEP PSID
1. Labor Market Transfers: Unemployment benefits;
Labor market programs
Unemployment benefits Unemployment benefits;
Workers’ compensation
2. Aid to Low-Income Families: Family support;
Housing support; Cash
transfers from the public;
(no private transfers)
Subsistence allowance;
Unemployment assistance
(up to 2004);
Unemployment benefits II
(since 2005)
Supplemental Security
Income;
Aid to Families with
Dependent Children
(AFDC);
Food Stamps;
Other Welfare
3. Social Security and Pensions: (Old Age) Pensions Combined old-age,
disability, civil service,
and company pensions
Combined (Old Age)
Social Security and
Disability (OASI)
Note: Table lists the measures used in the three data sets to construct subcom-
ponents of transfers.
The second component considered, “aid to low-income families,” consists of
several measures of social insurance policies specifically aimed at at-risk house-
holds. The relevance of this type of transfer can therefore be expected to matter
most for low-income households who have a higher likelihood of falling down to
fulfilling ’at-risk’ criteria in the course of a recession. The third component,
pension payments, is not directly connected to business cycle considerations. It
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can still play a relevant role for household members near or at retirement age,
who may take up pension payments instead of unemployment payments if they
decide to leave the labor market upon job loss.
The Overall Effect of the Tax and Transfer System
We begin with a brief discussion on the overall effect of the government, compar-
ing the cyclicality of pre- and post-government measures of household earnings
listed in rows 1 and 2 of Table IV. Again, Figures 1.6 and 1.7 visualize the
findings. We find that social policy is an important source of insurance against
aggregate fluctuations in all three economies, with very similar overall effects.
Motivated by the considerations from above sections, we directly consider the
reactions of the upper and lower tails of income changes. In all three economies,
downside risk is mitigated successfully by the tax and transfer system. In both
the United States and Germany, the lower tail of post-government earnings
changes is unresponsive to the business cycle–while significantly countercycli-
cal for pre-government earnings. In Sweden, lower tail counter-cyclicality is
dampened but still statistically significant (from a point estimate of –0.52 to
–0.38).
Considering the cyclicality of the upper tail reveals differences between the
countries. In Germany, it is unresponsive to the cycle for both pre-and post-
government earnings. While both the U.S. and Sweden reveal procyclicality
of L9050 of pre-government earnings changes, the L9050 of post-government
earnings changes is acyclical in Sweden, but still procyclical in the United States.
The different reactions of the tails translates into procyclical overall dispersion
of post-government earnings changes in the U.S., and countercyclical dispersion
in Sweden. Summarizing the reaction of overall dispersion and tails results
in procyclicality of Kelley’s skewness measure for both countries; though the
procyclicality is much smaller for post- than for pre-government earnings.
To sum up, the analysis suggests that downside risk in recessions is mitigated
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by taxes and transfers. In Sweden, an additional effect are lowered upside
chances in expansions. This lines up with considerations of Sweden as a country
with a high degree of redistribution.
The Role of Subcomponents of Social Policy
The measure of post-government earnings used so far lumps a lot of very dif-
ferent transfers received and taxes paid by households. While this measure is
appropriate for assessing the overall effect of the tax and transfers system, it is
not as well suited for understanding the success of different social policies that
specifically aim at mitigating downside risk or that aims at aiding low-income
families, who can be expected to be especially vulnerable in recessionary periods.
Therefore, we now consider different types of transfers separately. The results
of the cyclicality analysis are listed in Table VI. As for for the estimates of total
taxes and transfers, we compare the coefficients to the ones from the household
gross earnings analysis in row 1 of Table IV. Recall that in order to be in the
year t base sample for the analysis, the lowest considered income measure of a
household needs to be above the income threshold for that year. This way, we
ensure that the sample is stable at the lower end of the distribution and results
are not driven by low-income households entering the sample for a certain type
of transfer but are not in the sample when considering another.
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Table VI: Cyclicality of Household Earnings - transfers added separately
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
+ Labor transfers 0.60 1.59*** 0.92*** –0.33
(1.54) (5.20) (4.20) (–1.34)
+ Aid to low-income 0.21 1.90*** 0.89*** –0.69***
(0.77) (6.13) (5.16) (–3.33)
+ Pensions 0.22 1.82*** 0.86*** –0.64***
(0.80) (5.61) (4.79) (–3.06)
Sweden
+ Labor transfers –0.22 1.14*** 0.13* –0.35**
(–1.23) (4.23) (2.04) (–2.58)
+ Aid to low-income –0.07 2.11*** 0.42*** –0.49**
(–0.38) (3.72) (4.51) (–2.47)
+ Pensions –0.07 2.34*** 0.48*** –0.55**
(–0.43) (3.55) (4.50) (–2.68)
Germany (SOEP)
+ Labor transfers –1.09*** 1.34** –0.13 –0.96***
(–2.96) (2.50) (–0.60) (–3.65)
+ Aid to low-income –1.32*** 1.66** –0.11 –1.21***
(–3.82) (2.40) (–0.47) (–4.08)
+ Pensions –1.21*** 1.80*** –0.04 –1.17***
(–3.30) (3.10) (–0.18) (–4.58)
Note: See notes for Table II.
The results in Table VI show that out of the three transfer components,
labor market related transfers (which have unemployment benefits as the main
component) accounts for most of the reduction in downside. The other two
components of transfers do not have any impact on cyclicality as measured by
our cyclicality regressions. For all three economies, the point estimates when
adding aid to low-income families or pensions are almost identical to the ones
for gross earnings.
A closer look at the estimated coefficients reveal some interesting differences
between the countries. In Sweden, labor market transfers account for almost
the whole difference between pre- and post-government earnings cyclicality in
the tails (compare rows 1 and 2 in Table V with row 1 in Table VI). Thus only
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a tiny amount is accounted for by the Swedish tax system or other transfers.
In the U.S., labor market transfers similarly accounts for the entire reduction
in lower tail cyclicality. But the upper tail is unaffected by labor market transfer,
and it is barely affected by aid to low-income families or pensions. This suggest
that the lower procyclicality of the upper tail of U.S. post-government earnings
changes is accounted for by U.S. tax system (or some interaction between taxes
and transfers).
Finally, in Germany labor market transfers also mitigates downside risk,
but it does so to a lesser extent than in Sweden and the United States. Rows
1 and 2 in Table V and row 1 in Table VI, shows that households earnings
plus labor market transfers display significant down-side risk, (smaller but quite
similar coefficients that those on household earnings), whereas post-government
earnings changes are acyclical. The former finding is corroborated on individual
earnings changes using our larger sample based on the SIAB data base. Besides
individual earnings SIAB also contains information on unemployment benefits
at the individual level. Table VII shows results for individual level regressions for
male and female earnings separately, when unemployment benefits are excluded
(rows 1 and 3) and included (2 and 4). These individual level results line
up well with the household level analysis conducted using SOEP data; labor
market transfers mitigate the cyclicality of the tails but there is still significant
higher order income risk even when unemployment benefits are included in the
income measure. This suggest that the German tax system (or interaction terms
between taxes and transfers) is the primary reason for post-government earnings
being acyclical.
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Table VII: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings including unemployment benefits
in Germany (SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Male Earnings 0.11 5.71*** 0.97*** –0.86***
(0.26) (5.32) (2.93) (–4.40)
+Unempl. benefits 0.15 5.12*** 0.84** –0.70***
(0.34) (5.24) (2.61) (–4.01)
Female Earnings 0.46 2.69* 0.89 –0.44*
(0.60) (1.92) (1.26) (–1.74)
+ Unempl. benefits 0.50 2.43* 0.82 –0.32
(0.67) (1.82) (1.22) (–1.43)
Note: See notes for Table II. Difference to estimates in II are due to
the fact that regressions start in 1981 instead of 1976.
1.5.3 Sensitivity of results to choice of lag length
All results reported in the text refer to the distribution of what we label
transitory, i.e., one-year changes of several income measures.19 Given the focus
of Storesletten et al. (2004) or Guvenen et al. (2014), to which we relate our
results, on persistent income changes this choice needs to be discussed. The
main reason for us to focus on one-year changes is that we choose a regression
framework as our main tool of analysis. We make this choice, because we com-
pare the cyclicality of income risk across countries. While for the US it is widely
accepted to base the dating of business cycles on NBER recession dates, this
dating is less clear cut for both Germany and Sweden. More generally, it is not
clear that in a cross-country comparison the dating of business cycles is of the
same quality in terms of capturing actual economic conditions. Our regression
framework allows a very clear interpretation and comparison of cyclicality of
income changes.
Moving to five-year changes—which are closer to capturing persistent changes—would
imply problems with the regression analysis for two reasons. One option would
19Recall that for the US we define two-year changes as transitory in order to account for
the biannual nature of the PSID since 1997.
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be to use non-overlapping five-year changes of income and GDP, another would
be to use overlapping changes. The first option would give too few data points
for a regression analysis, while the second would open the door to usual problems
of overlapping data.
The time-series of five-year changes is shown in figures ?? to ?? in Appendix
??. Comparison to the one-year changes suggest the same qualitative patterns.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how higher-order income risk varies over the business cy-
cle, as well as the extent to which such risks can be smoothed within households
or with government social insurance policies. To provide a broad perspective
on these questions, we studied panel data on individuals and households from
the United States, Germany, and Sweden, covering more than three decades of
data for each country.
We find that the underlying variation in higher-order risk is remarkably
similar across these countries that differ in many details of their labor markets.
In particular, in all three countries, the variance of earnings shocks is almost
entirely constant over the business cycle, whereas the skewness of these shocks
becomes much more negative in recessions.
Government provided insurance, in the form of unemployment insurance,
welfare benefits, aid to low income households, and the like, plays a more im-
portant role reducing downside risk in all three countries; the effectiveness is
weakest in the United States, and most pronounced in Germany. For Sweden
we find that insurance provided within households plays a similar role.
Overall, we have provided evidence of the important role played by govern-
ment policy in insuring households against aggregate fluctuations that originate
asymmetric changes in the earnings distribution. Furthermore, we have shown
how the effects vary by the characteristics of the individuals and the specific
public instrument. A quantitative analysis is out of the scope of this paper.
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However, our results call for further research on public policy design that ac-
counts for the asymmetric response of idiosyncratic earnings risk to business-
cycle fluctuations.
Chapter 2
Employment Protection
Legislation and Earnings Risk
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2.1 Introduction
What are the implications of employment protection legislation for individual
income risk? In this paper, we characterize the dynamics of earnings uncertainty
in dual labor markets. The purpose of this study is two-fold: On the one hand,
we seek to shed light on the institutional determinants of earnings risk over
the workers’ lifetime. In other words, how different exposure to stringent or
flexible labor markets can influence income uncertainty and, hence, individual
behavior. On the other hand, we want to investigate the particular case of
income dynamics in dual labor markets.
Dual labor markets are limited by two forms of contracting: highly protected
open-ended contracts and unprotected temporary contracts. The latter were in-
troduced with the goal of lowering unemployment and acting as stepping stones
towards better job matches. Nevertheless, this labor market regime has been
found to favor various detrimental labor market outcomes, namely lower human
capital accumulation, lower productivity, and higher inequality Bonhomme and
Hospido (2013) than comparable fully rigid or fully flexible arrangements. Yet,
to the best of our knowledge, the literature has been silent about its implications
on earnings dynamics.
There is evidence that employment protection legislation is failing at de-
creasing the exposure of workers to income volatility. Cross-country empirical
studies in Europe (OECD (2011)) have found a significant positive correlation
between employment protection and earnings volatility. Given the high firing
costs and the low churning rate of regular forms of employment in most of these
countries, this relation is puzzling. We will show that our results suggest that
this relation can be explained by the fact that the countries with the high-
est firing costs also have a high fraction of the active population in temporary
contracts.
A key element of our analysis is the use of high-quality administrative panel
data from Spain. We combine the detailed information on employment histories
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from the Spanish Social Security Administration (MCVL hereafter, following its
acronym in Spanish) and the linked income data from the tax registers. The
former contains very detailed information on all the jobs a worker has held over
her career, including employer, type of contract, number of days, and salary.
The Tax data complements the salary reported in the MCVL with other forms
of income and, importantly, with non-top-coded earnings. The combination of
these two linked sources of data is a useful and unique resource for our study,
but also presents challenges. The main concern we face is the representativeness
of the sample. While the MCVL selects a 4% representative sample of the
population, the tax supplement excludes some groups. In Section 2.2 we explore
the importance of these issues.
In our analysis, we pose a model of income dynamics that captures the
salient features of the life-cycle. We estimate the model using a method of
moments and allow variation by the different exposure to temporary forms of
employment. In particular, we estimate the age profile of the persistence and
variance of labor income shocks, separately for workers that spent most of their
career in fixed-term contracts – job-unstable – and the rest – job-stable –. We
use college-educated males as the benchmark group in order to isolate from
observed heterogeneity. We exploit the panel dimension of our data and include
individual fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
We find that the job-unstable workers face larger uncertainty, as represented
by the variance of permanent shocks, at all ages after the age of 25. This
uncertainty is U-shaped for the job-unstable group, while it is mostly decreasing
in age for the job-stable group. The persistence of shocks is hump-shaped for
both groups, peaking around the mid-career years at 0.95, but it is on average
higher for the job-unstable group (0.85 as compared to 0.75). We perform the
same analysis for females and less educated groups, with varying results. Finally,
we illustrate the importance of capturing the differential dynamics of temporary
and permanent workers in a simple application.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and
the sample in detail. Section 2.3 presents the empirical strategy and estimation.
Section 2.4 discusses the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Sample
2.2.1 The Data: Social Security and Tax Records
We use administrative data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories on
earnings and working histories of Spanish workers. The data is provided by the
Spanish Social Security Administration in cooperation with the IRS counterpart
in Spain.
The MCVL consists of a 4% representative random sample of all workers
affiliated with the social security administration within a given year between
2004 and 2015. Besides, starting in 2005, the sample has a panel design: all
individuals present in each wave subsequently remain in the sample. Retroactive
information on the whole working history is provided as early as 1962 for work
variables and 1980 for earnings. Bonhomme and Hospido (2013) show that the
sample is representative at least since the late 1980s. The main drawback is that
earnings data is bottom- and top-coded. We, therefore, complement the earnings
data with the tax supplement provided by the IRS and matched to the Social
Security records. The tax supplement contains non-top-coded information on
annual earnings but does not include such detailed job characteristics or earnings
a higher-frequency levels.
2.2.2 Sample Selection
We select individuals at least 19 and at most 60 years old. For the case of
the college graduates, we further restrict the sample to individuals at least 22
years old. That is, we drop those who graduated before the age of 22.
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2.2.3 Main Variables
Earnings. The earnings data are extracted from the "Annual summary
of retentions and payments for the personal income tax on earnings, economic
activities, awards, and income imputations" (known as Modelo 190 ). All em-
ployers are required to fill out Modelo 190 with the total compensation paid to
each of their employees during the year, independently of whether or not they
pay labor income taxes. To obtain a measure of total annual labor earnings, we
add all the incomes that correspond to each worker during the reference year.
Educational Attainment. We define four education groups:
1. Less than high school graduate
2. Finished first two years of high-school, and possibly a lower-ranked voca-
tional training.
3. High school graduates, and possibly an advanced vocational training, but
not college.
4. College and above.
Annual Employment Status. Given that our period of observation is one
year, it is not uncommon to find workers that hold different simultaneous jobs
or that change jobs within the same year. In some cases, some of those contracts
are temporary and some permanent. This poses a challenge when defining em-
ployment spells at the annual level. To be able to exploit the daily employment
information back to the 1980s, we define employment status in terms of share of
annual time spent in each kind of job: permanent, temporary, or none. Workers
who have zero annual earnings or earn less that the corresponding amount to a
month minimum-wage salary are considered unemployed.
Young Employment Status. We define young permanent workers as
those who spent most of their 20s (20 to 30 years old) under a permanent con-
tract. We define young temporary workers and young unemployed accordingly.
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Prime Employment Status. We define prime permanent workers as
those who spent most of their peak working years (35 to 60 years old) under a
permanent contract. We define prime temporary workers and prime unemployed
accordingly.
Lifetime Employment Status. We define lifetime permanent workers as
those who spent most of their working years under a permanent contract. We
define lifetime temporary workers and lifetime unemployed accordingly.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 A Framework to Measure Life-Cycle Earnings Risk
In this section, we pose and estimate a stochastic income process to measure
the uncertainty faced by different workers at each age. We group workers based
of their exposure to temporary forms of employment during the first 10 years
of their working lives. The statistical framework follows Karahan and Ozkan
(2013).
More specifically, let Yiat be Annual earnings for individual i at age a in year
t. We assume log Yiat is given by
log Yiat = βXiat + yiat, (2.1)
where Xiat is a vector of observable characteristics that includes a quartic poly-
nomial in age, year dummies, and region dummies. β is assumed constant in
time.
The residual income from the first stage yiat is decomposed into three com-
ponents: (1) an individual deterministic component αi + γia, formed by a fixed
effect and a linear trend; (2) a stochastic persistent component ziat, modeled
as an AR(1) with persistence ρ < 1; and (3) a stochastic transitory component
uiat, represented by a MA(1). The specific structure is given below by equations
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(2.2)-(2.5):
yiat = αi + γia+ uiat + ziat αi ∼ N(0, σ2α,a), γi ∼ N(0, σ2γ,a) (2.2)
uiat = εiat + θεi,a−1,t−1 εiat ∼ N(0, σ2ε,a) (2.3)
ziat = ρzi,a−1,t−1 + ηiat ηiat ∼ N(0, σ2η,a) (2.4)
zi0t = 0, εi0t = 0. (2.5)
To capture the evolution of uncertainty over life, parameters ρ, σε, and ση
are functiones of age. The exact form of age dependence will be discussed next.
2.3.2 Estimation
Our baseline model assumes that σ2ε,a, σ2η,a, and ρ are all cubic functions of age,
and θ, σα, and σγ are fixed across ages.
We minimize the distance between the empirical and the model-implied
closed-form covariance matrix to estimated the parameters, using Generalized
Method of Moments with efficient weighting matrix, to estimate the parameters.
(θ, σα, σγ , ρ(·), σε(·), ση(·)) (2.6)
2.3.3 Grouping Workers
Based on the definition of young employment status, we define two groups
of workers: those that have spent 50% or more of their days before the age of
30 in a temporary contract, which we call job-unstable, and the rest, denoted
job-stable. We estimate the process separately for each group.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Life-Cycle Earnings Dynamics of Temporary and Perma-
nent Workers
This section reports the estimates at every age. Overall, the job-unstable group
experiences a larger degree of uncertainty and shock persistence. However, the
more interesting results concern the dynamics over the life-cycle that we discuss
next.
Notice how workers that have been more exposed to temporary contracts
face more uncertainty over life. Moreover, looking at the variance of permanent
shocks, at all ages above 25 uncertainty is U-shaped for the job-unstable group,
while it is mostly decreasing in age for the job-stable group. The persistence
of shocks is hump-shaped for both groups, peaking around 0.95, but it is on
average higher for the job-unstable group and it peaks much later in life for
those more exposed to temporary contracts.
Looking at the dynamics of transitory shocks, while those in the job-stable
group feature a clear life-cycle profile, decreasing in the middle of the career
and then increasing as retirement approaches, workers in the job-unstable group
barely see a change in their variance.
Figure 2.1: Persistence
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Figure 2.2: Variance of Persistent Shocks
Figure 2.3: Variance of Trasitory Shocks
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studied the role of labor market institutions in shaping individu-
als’ exposure to earnings uncertainty over their life cycle. Using administrative
data from Spain and a method of moments, we estimate the labor income pro-
files for different workers, depending on their exposure to temporary forms of
employment. In particular, we estimate the age profile of the persistence and
variance of labor income shocks, separately for workers that spent most of their
career in fixed-term contracts – job-unstable – and the rest – job-stable –. We
use college-educated males as the benchmark group, in order to isolate forms of
observed heterogeneity. We exploit the panel dimension of our data and include
individual fixed effects.
We find that the job-unstable workers face larger uncertainty, as represented
by the variance of permanent shocks, at all ages after the age of 25. This
uncertainty is U-shaped for the job-unstable group, while it is mostly decreasing
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in age for the job-stable group. The persistence of shocks is hump-shaped for
both groups, peaking around the mid-career years at 0.95, but it is on average
higher for the job-unstable group (0.85 as compared to 0.75).
These results have implications for the design of public policy. In particular,
Cabrales et al (2017) show that allowing for the specific dynamics for each type of
worker is crucial to evaluate the effects of the introduction of income-contingent
public loans to finance higher education.
Chapter 3
Consumption and Self-Insurance
with Higher-Order Earnings
Risk
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3.1 Introduction
To what extent are a household’s labor income fluctuations uninsurable? More
broadly, what characterizes the joint distribution of income and consumption
changes? These questions are critical for the design of a social insurance policy
that is effective for lessening the burden of idiosyncratic income uncertainty on
individuals. They are also at the core of understanding the changes in con-
sumption inequality and welfare as a result of shifts in the distribution of labor
income. Nevertheless, these questions remain open, largely due to the scarcity
of nonparametric studies of the income distribution and consumption panels.
Few studies have inspected changes in income growth from an agnostic, non-
parametric perspective. Those who have (Geweke and Keane, 2000; Bonhomme
and Robin, 2009; Guvenen et al., 2016), however, reach a remarkably common
conclusion: earnings changes are not normally distributed and, in particular,
exhibit a high level of excess kurtosis (i.e. the importance of the tails and cen-
ter of the distribution in relation to the area in between). Leaving the technical
details to the main text, this means that the incidence of moderate-size changes
is substantially smaller than under a log-normal distribution. In fact, in a given
year, most individuals see little or no change in their labor income; a few ex-
perience extreme events. Yet, with few notable exceptions, studies that look
at joint changes in income, consumption, and marginal responses are biased
towards average or moderate-size income changes – one standard deviation up
or down – and disregard that (1) the average shock is very small and (2) not
all income shocks are equally shocking. As a result, little attention has been
devoted to the potentially most disruptive part of the distribution: the tails.
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, using panel data from
the PSID on income, public transfers, and nondurable and durable consump-
tion, I characterize the marginal and joint distributions of after-transfers house-
hold earnings and consumption changes. I show that excess kurtosis is not an
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exclusive feature of individual earnings, which fades out when transfers are con-
sidered. On the contrary, household earnings’, nondurable consumption, and
durable consumption growth exhibit deviations from log-normality, especially
the latter. This is surprising, as one would expect most of the large changes to
go away with the inclusion of both spouses’ incomes and, especially, government
transfers. Whether or not that implies a higher risk for households in the form
of larger consumption fluctuations is unclear. Larger changes usually trigger
insurance mechanisms that moderate changes do not. Acquiring insurance for
disasters, moving back home with family, or buying a better car in the case of a
positive change are all examples of mechanisms that households are likely to use
in the case of extreme events. Because it is practically impossible to account for
all these forms of risk-sharing and self-insurance, I follow the common practice
of inspecting the joint distribution of consumption and earnings (Deaton and
Paxson, 1994; Altonji et al., 1996; Blundell et al., 2008). Given my focus on
the extremes of the distribution, I define new measures of comovement between
earnings and consumption changes, which are borrowed from the finance liter-
ature in which the analysis of tails is typical. These measures will be defined
in the main text but fall within the common denomination of tail dependence.
While the overall covariance between earnings and nondurables is considerably
higher than for durables, empirical measures of tail dependence show that the
opposite is true in the case of extreme events. That is, earnings and nondurable
consumption are correlated but less so in the tails. The opposite happens for
durable consumption. This suggests that both types of goods be viewed as
complementary in order to understand the response of consumption to income
shocks.
Motivated by the empirical findings, the second contribution of this paper
is the incorporation of durable consumption adjustments in a life-cycle, incom-
plete markets model with higher-order, idiosyncratic income risk in order to
calculate the consumption response to structural tail shocks. In this case, a
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model is necessary as non-linearities are pervasive. Beyond the non-linearities
implied by the presence of borrowing constraints1, the size of the tail shocks cre-
ates jumps that usual, empirical identification strategies can hardly capture2.
I model earnings as a mixture of two normals plus a deterministic age profile,
which is flexible enough to capture the excess kurtosis observed in the data.
Richer forms of statistical processes have been proposed in the literature, start-
ing with Geweke and Keane (2000) and, more recently, De Nardi et al. (2016)
and Guvenen et al. (2016). The mixture of two normals is enough to capture
the differences with respect to a model without tail risk, which is the main point
of my analysis. Durable consumption expenditures are exposed to non-convex
adjustments’ costs. This implies that the decision rule for durable consumption
follows a Ss-type behavior, which will be the centerpiece of my mechanism.
To parameterize the model, I proceed in two steps. First, I use a simulated
moments’ method to estimate the parameters of the earnings process, target-
ing the second through fourth moments of four-year growth in after-transfers
income. Additionally, I target the age profile of the variance of log income lev-
els, which is important to discipline the persistence of income shocks. Next,
I proceed to calibrate the remaining parameters of the model to match both
aggregate and microeconomic targets. In addition to the targeted moments,
I evaluate the fit of my model comparing the Quantile-Quantile plots of the
earnings and consumption changes distribution, both durable and nondurable
separately.
Finally, I use the calibrated model to test a series of implications of tail
income shocks for the response of both durable and nondurable consumption,
as well as for the degree of self-insurance of households. Not surprisingly, large
income shocks do have a strong impact on the probability of durable adjustment,
and the response is of the Ss-type, as expected. That is, there is practically
1See Kaplan and Violante (2010) for an in-depth discussion of the implications of borrowing
constraints for empirical measures of self-insurance whose identification relies on the linearity
of policy rules.
2A notable exception is Arellano et al. (2014).
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no change in the middle part of the distribution. There are two mechanisms
that generate leptokurtosis in durable consumption changes in the model: One
is the endogenous lumpiness in the adjustment of durable consumption as a
result of adjustment costs, but there is also a delayed upward adjustment from
the option value of durable goods. These two mechanisms are consistent with
empirical evidence in (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007) and Browning and Crossley
(2009), respectively.
Looking at the response of nondurable consumption and the degree of partial
insurance, I find that the average transmission coefficients (commonly known
as BPP coefficients) are not very different from the current estimates in the
literature; roughly a bit over half of the income shocks are transmitted to non-
durable consumption. This implies that close to half of the income shocks are
insured via risk-sharing and self-insurance. However, I show that this is masked
by a large amount of heterogeneity in the size of the shock. Quantile regressions
of consumption change on the structural income shocks show that there is a
substantial response to extreme shocks.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to several streams of the literature, but mainly falls at the
corner between the measurement of uninsurable income risk and the implications
of higher-order moments in income changes for household consumption. The
literature on consumption or partial insurance has a long list of reference papers
(Blundell et al., 2008; Primiceri and van Rens, 2009; Kaplan and Violante, 2010;
Guvenen and Smith, 2014). All of them look at the response of nondurable
consumption to unexpected income changes. The latter two estimate structural
versions to account for nonlinearities in the consumption rule. My contribution
to that literature is twofold: (1) I model the distribution of earnings in a way that
potentially very large shocks of nonnegligible density can happen; and (2) I show
the importance of studying nondurable consumption decisions in connection to
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durable to understand the substitution between the two at different parts of the
income shocks distribution.
The only other paper, to the extent of my knowledge, that considers durable
consumption in a life-cycle incomplete markets model for the purpose of evalu-
ating the ability of households to self-insure is Cerletti and Pijoan-Mas (2012).
There are three main differences in our frameworks: In their model, adjustment
of durable goods is smooth, not subject to adjustment costs. This responds
to the fact that their main focus is how durables provide a rebalancing option
that alleviates borrowing constraints in the event of an unexpected shock. The
second difference is their income process, which follows a standard random walk
plus white noise. Lastly, our definition of durables differs in that I include
housing as a durable good.
The empirical observation that individual earnings changes are leptokurtic
is not new. Over a decade ago, Geweke and Keane (2000) characterize the
distribution of male earnings in the PSID and find that a normal does poorly at
approximating the observed numbers, which resemble a leptokurtic distribution.
Bonhomme and Robin (2009), also making use of advances in nonparametric
econometric methods, show that the same is true for France. This literature
has become especially prolific in the last couple of years with the increasing
availability of administrative data. Guvenen et al. (2016) study the dynamics
of earnings over the lifecycle using social security records of millions of workers.
Their sample size allows for a fully nonparametric analysis. Compared the
previous papers, they document that there is a large amount of heterogeneity
in the higher-order moments over the life cycle and initial level of earnings.
While previous papers have reported numbers of slightly below t10 (Bagger
et al., 2014), it ranges from 4 to 40 for different ages and income status. To this
literature, my main contribution is to measure whether the tail changes implied
by the higher-order moments in income, that could be potentially very disruptive
if taken at face value, have any impact on consumption and household’s welfare.
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First, by looking at data for households after government transfers, and second
by moving forward to the response of consumption. While my sample is much
smaller and my data is exposed to measurement error, the rich set of covariates
provides a different set of insights.
Chetty and Szeidl (2007) and Browning and Crossley (2009) look and the
empirical relation between durable goods and income shocks. The former is
closer to this paper in the sense that it focuses on household lumpy consumption
responses to a large wage shock. The latter focuses on smaller durables, such as
clothing, furniture, and the like. While methodologically different, their results
are consistent with my findings. They both provide a theoretical framework
that hints at a stronger response of durables in the event of an unemployment
shock, dampening the transmission to nondurables. They conjecture an increase
in welfare coming from the lower fluctuations in nondurable consumption, but
their frameworks, unlike mine, do not allow for a welfare analysis of the value of
durable consumption as a margin of adjustment in the event of income shocks.
The quantitative response of durable consumption to income shocks has
been studied extensively in a business-cycle environment. Considering that re-
cessions and expansions are times in which large negative and positive shocks,
respectively, are more frequent, this paper is also related to this literature that
includes, for example, Grossman and Laroque (1990); Flavin and Nakagawa
(2004); Berger and Vavra (2015). The closest to my framework, but in an
infinitely-lived households version, is the latter. Our problems are conceptually
different, though. Their focus is in how positive durable expenditures respond
more or less sluggishly to economic shocks. As a result, I set up the problem so
that households can upgrade or downgrade the size of their durables. Consid-
ering the comparable case of upwards movements in my model, my results are
consistent with theirs.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 empiri-
cally inspects the marginal and joint distribution of earnings and consumption
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changes, the baseline model and its calibration are described in Section 3.3,
Section 3.4 explains the main results and implications. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Tails of Earnings and Consumption Changes
in The Data
This section presents an empirical characterization of tail events in income and
consumption changes, as well as their relation. After presenting the data and
sample selection, I show the moments of the distribution of the variables of
interest, with a focus on the higher-order moments. Next, I examine the joint
behavior of consumption and earnings changes. When the marginal distributions
are fat-tailed, the tail area dependence might be quite different to that suggested
by the correlation. I then define a concept of tail dependence between consump-
tion and earnings changes, separately for durable and nondurable goods, that
is novel in this literature.
3.2.1 Data and Sample
This section describes the data used both in the empirical analysis and to con-
struct the moments used in the calibration.
The new PSID
The PSID is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. households,
tracking a wide variety of socioeconomic variables from 1968 to 2013. It is also
one of the most commonly used micro-data sources for the study of income
dynamics. Therefore, in this section, I give a brief overview and focus on the
recent waves that contain detailed data on consumption. I refer the reader to
Heathcote et al. (2010), for example, for the basics and structure of the PSID.
The PSID originally started as a survey for the study of poverty, hence its
focus on socioeconomic covariates and income. Before the 1999 wave, the only
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information on expenditures was food and rent3. Starting in 1999, a wide set of
consumption categories was added, comparable to the CEX in the aggregates—
although with less detail in the subcategories. The new PSID spans 14 years
(1998–2012) and contains information on income, consumption, and wealth. In
addition, for some exercises, I include the previous five waves (1993–1997) in
order to construct controls that concern past family and income characteristics.
Sample Selection
The sample of reference includes households whose heads are between 25 and
60 years old, have not retired, and that have not suffered major changes in
their family structure in the past two years. I also impose that they have at
least three consecutive observations between 1998 and 2012. I keep both the
original representative SRC sample and the SEO sample from the PSID, with
the appropriate weighting.
For the main analysis, I use data for the period 1998–2012, which corresponds
to the waves containing detailed consumption information. In addition to the
availability of consumption data, this shorter panel has several advantages over
the longer horizon. First, the level of attrition is higher in the initial years of
the survey, and the number of households remaining in the sample 30 years
later – by the time expenditures are recorded – is very small. Second, the 1993
PSID wave – corresponding to information for the 1992 year – underwent a
major revision in main variables concerning labor income; starting in that year
eliminates spurious variation and the need to make assumptions to homogenize
those variables over time.
The final sample with information on income and consumption is comprised
of around 20000 observations, corresponding to approximately 5000 households
over 15 years. More details, including the number of observations left at each
step of the sample selection, are given in Appendix B.1.
3Some data on the value of owned houses and vehicles was provided, but this was generally
inconsistent over time, and no data on actual expenditures on these durables was reported.
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Definitions of Income and Consumption
Several measures of earnings and consumption are used along the paper. For
earnings, the reference measure will be household earnings after taxes and trans-
fers, which I will also refer toÂ as post-government income. Post-government
household earnings are defined as pre-government household labor income plus
public transfers minus federal income taxes. Pre-government household labor
income is composed of the head of household’s labor income plus the spouse’s
labor income. Each member’s labor income excludes self-employment. Transfers
include unemployment insurance, welfare, and social security. Federal income
taxes are calculated using TAXSIM.
For the case of consumption, nondurable consumption includes food, utili-
ties, nondurable transportation, and recreation. Durable consumption includes
houses, cars, furnishings and repairs, and clothing. A detailed description of all
consumption subcategories and the exact construction of each variable can be
found in Appendix B.1.
All amounts shown in dollars are in real 2010 dollars, deflated using the
general PCE index for income and nondurable consumption categories, except
for housing and vehicles. Housing and vehicle-related expenditures and adjust-
ments are deflated using the corresponding PCE for housing and motor vehicles,
respectively.
3.2.2 Tail Changes at the Household Level
Measures of Changes and Adjustments
Measuring consumption changes in income and nondurable goods and services
is a relatively straightforward task. The case of durable consumption, however,
requires some discussion.
It will be helpful to start by defining two measures of change that will be
central in my analysis: Let log ∆s(x) and arc∆s(x) denote the log- and the
arc-change in x from the the current period to s periods ahead, respectively.
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Formally:
log ∆s(xt) ≡ log xt+s − log xt
arc∆s(xt) ≡ xt+s − xt
(xt+s + xt)/2
.
The default measure will be log-changes. I next explain how I define adjustments
in durable consumption.
For the case of the smaller durables, direct expenditure values are reported.
For the case of vehicles and houses, I follow the definitions in Chetty and Szeidl
(2007), who define an adjustment as the change in vehicles and houses beyond
depreciation. To minimize measurement error, I combine data on exchanges of
vehicles and sales of houses with self-reported moves and value of the stock.
If no move, purchase, or sale is reported, and the value of the good, as well
as property taxes and home insurance, is within 20% of their valueÂ from last
year, no adjustment is recorded. For the rest of the cases, I define different
situations that are explained in Appendix B.1 but, in general, an adjustment is
considered. The value of the adjustment is an average between the self-reported
value of the house or car and the value of the exchange, which very often coincide.
Changes in durable consumption are calculated applying the measures described
above directly on the value of the stock. If there is an adjustment, the value is
converted to real values using the corresponding PCE for each category. I refer
to changes in durables as adjustments, as a reminder that they are changes in
the stock.
Next, I turn to analyze the distribution of changes in labor income and
consumption. To inspect the extent to which these changes deviate from nor-
mality and, in particular, exhibit fat tails, I make use of two descriptive tools:
higher-order moments and Quantile-Quantile plots.
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Higher-order Moments and Deviations from Normality
To provide a definition of tail changes, I first look at the empirical distribution
of labor income changes. The first panel of Figure 3.1 shows the distribution
of household income after taxes and transfers. Table II reports the share and
usual amount of income change for different sizes. This is an alternative and
more intuitive representation of the same idea behind Figure 3.1.
The four first central moments of the distribution are useful descriptors of
the underlying shape. Nonetheless, they are highly influenced by outliers and
are sometimes hard to interpret. Therefore, I will complement the information
contained in the central moments with their percentile-based counterparts. In
addition to being robust to outliers, these measures have a clear interpretation
in terms of easily identifiable parts of the distribution. Formally,
Pk ≡ kth percentile
Pk` ≡ Pk − P`
Kelley Skewness ≡ P9050− P5010
P9010
(3.1)
Crow-Siddiqui Kurtosis ≡ P97.5− P2.5
P7525
. (3.2)
Table I reports the values of the second through fourth moments of the dis-
tribution for different measures of earnings and consumption. I choose to include
the robust measures and relegate the remaining moments to the appendix, in
Table A.2. There are several important empirical results contained in this table.
Because they are the centerpiece of my empirical analysis, I will discuss them
in detail.
First, looking at the bold numbers referring to the whole sample, we can see
that all variables exhibit deviations from normality, mostly in the form of excess
kurtosis. This is a feature that is observed in administrative data for individual
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earnings, and it is thus important to observe it in my sample. More interesting
is the fact that excess kurtosis remains high after including the spouse’s earnings
and government transfers, which we would expect to dampen the fluctuations
in household income. Furthermore, changes in both measures of consumption
are far from log-normal. This result has been pointed out by Toda and Walsh
(2015) using the CEX data, but the fact that durable consumption changes
are strongly leptokurtic is unexplored. Appendix B.1 includes the histograms
corresponding to these variables in log scale, to emphasize the size of the tails.
The second point to notice in Table I is the life-cycle effect. While all mea-
sures of income become increasingly leptokurtic over time, the opposite happens
to consumption. The age effect on nondurable changes is not very strong, but it
is striking because a standard consumption-savings model with a high degree of
heterogeneity predicts an increasing level of kurtosis over time (Guvenen et al.,
2016). That is, there is empirical evidence of higher consumption insurance be-
yond self-insurance through savings against higher-order income risk if judged
by fluctuations in nondurable consumption.
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Table I: Higher-Order Moments of Earnings and Consumption
Standard Dev. Kelley Skewness C-S Kurtosis
(0 under a Normal) (2.91 under a Normal)
2-Year Changes
log ∆2yindt 0.654 -0.045 9.899
Y 0.660 -0.027 8.701
O 0.649 -0.074 11.059
log ∆2yhht 0.571 -0.043 7.018
Y 0.584 -0.048 6.542
O 0.559 -0.040 7.444
log ∆2ypostt 0.585 -0.055 6.890
Y 0.580 -0.035 6.515
O 0.589 -0.071 7.355
log ∆2ct 0.471 0.004 4.000
Y 0.488 -0.002 4.141
O 0.455 0.006 3.937
log ∆2dt 0.813 0.447 23.687
Y 0.936 0.510 26.671
O 0.692 0.339 19.182
4-Year Changes
log ∆4yindt 0.725 -0.126 8.151
Y 0.746 -0.121 7.797
O 0.703 -0.164 8.755
log ∆4yhht 0.632 -0.095 5.838
Y 0.654 -0.090 5.854
O 0.611 -0.089 5.782
log ∆4ypostt 0.660 -0.086 5.921
Y 0.683 -0.079 5.974
O 0.636 -0.092 5.827
log ∆4ct 0.514 -0.041 3.796
Y 0.537 -0.052 3.925
O 0.490 -0.032 3.775
log ∆4dt 1.004 0.451 16.836
Y 1.141 0.498 15.663
O 0.849 0.409 14.900
Note: Columns refer to the standard deviation and robust measures of skewness and kurtosis.
See equations (3.1) and (3.2) for definitions. Rows include yind: individual earnings (heads),
yhh: household pre-gov. earnings, ypost: households post-gov. earnings, c: nondurable con-
sumption, d: durable consumption. See Section 3.2.1 for detailed definitions. Y : Age group
25-44, O : Age group 45-60. See Table A.2 for extra moments.
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To provide a more intuitive characterization of how disturbing tail events in
income can potentially be, Table II shows the share of households experiencing
changes of different sizes in a given year, as well as the size of the change, both in
log points and in dollars. For the moment, I pool positive and negative changes
in the absolute value of the change. In order to define a relative measure of
the size of the shock, I define thresholds depending on the number of standard
deviations from the mean. For the purpose of understanding the significance
of these numbers, it’s important to remind a couple of features of the normal
distribution so that we can understand its shortcomings. A normal distribution
assumes that (1) all values in the sample will be distributed equally above and
below the mean, and (2) only 0.3% of changes exceed three standard deviations
in absolute value. This number is over 3% in my sample.
Table II: Incidence of Log Earnings Changes by Size
Size Percent Average Size (log ∆) Average Size ($)
0 ≤ abs∆ < 1SD 82.79 0.15 6671.80
1SD ≤ abs∆ < 2SD 10.77 0.69 24536.16
2SD ≤ abs∆ < 3SD 2.90 1.21 36703.40
3SD ≤ abs∆ 3.53 2.80 43867.68
N 18,524
Note: abs∆ denotes the absolute value of log ∆. Earnings correspond to household earnings
after transfers, therefore one standard deviation is equal to 0.58 log points. Dollars are in
$2010.
Graphical Analysis
Despite the strong evidence against normality shown in I and II, it is still useful
to provide a graphical description of how these numbers show up in the data.
The upper panel in Figure 3.1 contains the histograms of all three main variables
of interest: changes in income, nondurable consumption, and durable consump-
tion, from left to right. The bars reflect the data, and the dashed line corre-
sponds to a normal distribution with the same variance, which is approximately
the distribution that would result from an estimated parametric specification
that constrains shocks to income to be log-normal. It becomes evident that the
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majority of the changes within two standard deviations (approximately between
-1 and 1) are very close to zero. However, it is very hard to extract conclusions
on the tails based on the histograms. This happens mainly because the density
function is bounded below by zero. Therefore, I complement the histograms
with two other graphical constructs: (1) Log-densities, shown in Appendix B.1,
and (2) Quantile-Quantile plots (QQ plots hereafter).
The lower panel in Figure 3.1 includes a set of QQ plots. QQ plots compare
two distributions by plotting their quantiles against each other. They represent
a particularly useful tool to assess the extent to which a variable is well approx-
imated by a normal, or any given distribution. Both axes correspond to the
x-axis in the histogram plot immediately above. We can thus think of the lower
panel to be the two distributions in the upper panel against each other: the
data is in the y-axis, and the normal is in the x-axis. As a result, the units are
log changes of the corresponding variable. For illustration purposes, the axes in
the case of earnings and durables are truncated at 3, but the conclusions do not
change since the tails just keep diverging.
I will start describing the dashed line, which corresponds to the 45-degree line
and coincides with the QQ plot if the variable in the y-axis was distributed ex-
actly as the reference distribution. Next, the solid line in the left panel contains
the sorted data. Notice that, particularly in the leftmost and rightmost graphs,
it follows an S-shape. This is a sign of fat tails4. In the negative quadrant,
points above (below) the 45-degree line are closer to (further from) the mean
than their normal counterpart. The opposite happens in the positive quadrant.
Moreover, the differences can reach 1 log point, despite being unnoticeable in
the histograms.
With these concepts in mind, we can look at the three graphs and immedi-
ately infer both the middle part of the distribution and the tails, independently
4Appendix B.1.3 includes a stylized example of QQ plots for usual distributions.
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of the scale of the y-axis and the size of the bins, as opposed to the case of the his-
tograms. In summary, both earnings and consumption exhibit deviations from
normality. Nondurable consumption does so to a lesser extent, but a normal
distribution would still miss the tails. The case of the durables is remarkable,
mostly due to the fact that many households do not change their stock at all in
a given year, but when they do, the change is large. Smaller adjustments corre-
spond to furnishings and other smaller durables. The next question of interest
is whether there is any relation between these tails of consumption and earnings
changes.
Figure 3.1: Empirical Distributions: Histograms and Deviations from Normality
(a) y (b) c (c) d
(d) y (e) c (f) d
3.2.3 Tail Dependence and the Joint Distribution of Earnings
and Consumption
The previous subsection showed that tail risk is pervasive even when private
and public transfers are considered, and also in consumption, especially durable.
Next, I assess the probability of these tail events that occur jointly in earnings
and consumption. For that purpose, I introduce one tool that will prove to be
useful in this context: tail dependence, or dependence of extreme events.
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Tail dependence is defined as the limiting probability that one random vari-
able exceeds a certain threshold given that another random variable has already
exceeded that specific threshold. Formally, the so-called τ -measure for the de-
pendence between the left tails of two random variables x and y is defined as
τy|x = lim
p→0
Pr(y < Qy(p) and x < Qx(p))
p
= lim
p→0
Pr(y < Qy(p)|x < Qx(p)),
where Qy(p) denotes the quantile of the distribution of y at probability
level p. It is very similar to the measure of correlation and does not imply
causality. If τ = 1, the tails of x and y are completely dependent, τ = 0 denotes
independence. There are several ways to estimate τ , I use the indicator proposed
by van Oordt and Zhou (2012) for its non-parametric nature.
The estimator of τy|x is defined as the ratio between the number of observa-
tions in which both x and y are extreme and those in which only x is extreme.
What being extreme means depends on the application. Formally:
τˆy|x =
∑n
i=1 IyiIxi∑n
i=1 IxiIxi
Ixi = 1(xi < Qx(k)),
where I choose k so that Qypost(k) = 1.5, 3 standard deviations for household
labor income.
Table III: Correlation and Tail Dependence Between Income And Consumption
Correlation Tail Dependence
Nondurable c 0.136 0.048
Durable c 0.084 0.213
Table III shows the empirical measure of tail dependence, as well as the usual
Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The Pearson’s correlation estimator averages
deviations from the mean and does thus not distinguish between extreme or
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moderate outcomes or the sign of the returns. It is interesting to see that
τ is very close to the Spearman’s rank correlation. Despite weaker than tail
dependence estimates, the Spearman’s rank correlation has often been used as
an alternative measure of joint tail behavior, and equals 0.068 and 0.187 for
nondurables and durables, respectively.
Figure 3.2 confirm these findings. Notice, in particular, the S shape of
the right panel. The steeper slope only indicates that the distribution is more
disperse, as in the illustrative example of the middle panel in figure A.3. The
S shape, however, is evidence of fatter tails of durable consumption changes as
compared to earnings changes.
Finally, I plot both the empirical distribution of income changes (in solid red)
and the corresponding normal distribution with the same variance (in dashed
thin red). With this, I want to emphasize the difference in densities of moderate
changes. In particular, for the case of durable consumption, assuming a normal
distribution in income would miss the important changes in durables.
At this point, it is evident that different measures point to a joint distribu-
tion of consumption and income that diverts at the tails. Moreover, the role of
durable consumption in measuring the response to tail shocks seems necessary.
An important problem with extreme events is the potential non-linear behavior
in income and consumption. It is thus very hard to identify the measures of in-
surance in an empirical fashion, as many of the identification assumptions would
be violated. As a result, in the next section, I develop a life-cycle incomplete-
markets model, which will allow me to compute structural responses within a
non-linear framework, as well as a wider set of implications.
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Figure 3.2: The Joint Distribution of Income and Consumption: nondurables
(left) vs. durables (right)
3.3 Model and Calibration
3.3.1 Model
In this section I present a life-cycle consumption-savings model with income
uncertainty and incomplete markets, with two additions to the standard5 case:
(1) households are allowed to adjust durable consumption, subject to non-convex
adjustment costs; and (2) shocks follow a distribution that is flexible enough to
exhibit the higher-order moments observed in the data.
The economy is populated by a continuum of finitely-lived households. Each
household works for TR periods, lives as a retiree for T − TR periods, and
dies with certainty at age T . During the retirement years, households have a
probability of surviving from age t to the next age t+ 1 equal to ξt < 1. Perfect
annuity markets are available.
In the remaining of this section, I first describe the specifics of the idiosyn-
cratic shocks and durable choices. Next, I go over the remaining elements of
the model and formally state the household problem and its solution algorithm.
Finally, I proceed to the calibration and estimation.
5Aiyagari (1994); Kaplan and Violante (2010).
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Idiosyncratic Shocks and Labor Income
During the working years, households receive an exogenous stream of labor
income exposed to idiosyncratic fluctuations. To avoid confounding private
consumption insurance with public government insurance, my income measure
of reference is post-government households’ earnings–that is, after transfers and
taxes. I will then make use of a tax function to recover pre-government earnings,
following Kaplan and Violante (2010).
Specifically, log labor income is the sum of a common deterministic age
profile gat and a household-specific stochastic component yit. The latter has two
elements: a transitory and a persistent element, with autoregressive coefficient ρ.
Transitory shocks are normally distributed6 with mean 0 and standard deviation
σε. Equations (3.3)-(3.6) formally summarize these relations.
Finally, equation (3.7) specifies the distribution of shocks to the persistent
component. This is a crucial element of my analysis. In particular, ηit follows
a mixture of two normals: with probability p, ηit will be drawn from a normal
distribution with mean µ1 and standard deviation σ1; and with probability 1−p
from a normal distribution with mean µ2 and standard deviation σ2. This type
of distribution is simple but flexible enough to match the higher-order moments
observed int he data.
log Yit = g
a
t + yit (3.3)
yit = zit + εit (3.4)
zit = ρzit−1 + ηit (3.5)
εit ∼ N (0, σε) (3.6)
6As pointed out in the introduction, the focus of this paper is the impact of potentially
large shocks of persistent nature. I, therefore, model transitory fluctuations in the standard
fashion.
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ηit ∼

N (µ1, σ1)
N (µ2, σ2)
with prob. p
with prob. 1− p
(3.7)
Durable Consumption Choice and Adjustment Costs
The choice to adjust durables is discrete. At each age t, households choose
whether to keep the undepreciated portion of their durable stock or to adjust
to one of the nd sizes in set D = {d0, · · · , dnd}. The relative price of durables
regarding non-durables is normalized to one.
Adjustment Costs. The adjustment of durable consumption is subject to
the non-convex adjustment cost A. A is a function of the current and the next
period’s stock of durables:
A (dt+1, dt) =

0
χ
2 ((1− δ)dt + dt+1)
if dt+1 = (1− δ)dt
otherwise
(3.8)
Notice that equation (3.8) can be rewritten as A (dt+1, dt) = χ(dt+edt ), where
edt ≡ dt+1 − (1 − δ)dt denotes durable expenditures at age t. This alternative
definition clearly exposes the presence of a fixed component, χdt, independent
on the size of the adjustment, making the adjustment costs non-convex.
Service Flow. As opposed to the case of non-durables, expenditures on
durable goods and the consumption services derived from them do not coin-
cide. To obtain the latter, I assume that the service flow from durables, sd, is
proportional to its stock at the beginning of every period:
sdt = κdt, κ > 1 (3.9)
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The Household Problem
Timing. The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of
the period households observe their realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks ε and
η. Next, households collect the capital income from the returns on their savings
and make their consumption-savings decision, including durable consumption.
Durables are chosen one period in advance, similarly to financial assets. This
means that, even when agents sell durables in the current period, the service
flow is received on the beginning-of-period stock.
Preferences. Households have standard CRRA preferences over a consump-
tion bundle of non-durable and durable consumption, denoted by c and d, re-
spectively. Both types of goods conform the consumption aggregate following a
Cobb-Douglas specification7. Future utility is discounted at the rate β ∈ (0, 1)
and, after retirement, households have a probability of surviving ξt ∈ (0, 1).
Formally,
E0
T∑
t=1
βt−1ξt
C (ct, st)1−γ
1− γ (3.10)
C(ct, st) ≡ cαt (st)1−α, (3.11)
where E0 is the expectation operator with respect to the stochastic processes
introduced in subsection 3.3.1, conditional on information available at time 0.
Borrowing and Saving. Households can borrow and save issuing a risk-free
bond. At every age, agents choose how much to save for the next period, at+1,
and earn capital gains rat on currently held bonds, where r > 0 is the risk-free
rate of return. Borrowing is constrained to a fraction λy of minimum labor
income, yt, and a fraction λd of the chosen stock of durables, which can be
understood as collateralized borrowing or a downpayment requirement in the
case of adjustment:
7Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) provide evidence in favor of the Cobb-Douglass aggregation
of both consumption goods.
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at+1 ≥ −λyyt − λddt+1 (3.12)
In the baseline case, I assume λy = 0, meaning that borrowing other than
collaterized or for downpayments is ruled out.
Pensions. Income at retirement mimics the US system. Pensions are a function
of lifetime average gross earnings8. Let Y¯ Ri denote the average labor income over
the working life of a household and Y¯ the average labor income in the economy.
Then, pension income is defined as:
P
(
Y¯ Ri
)
=

0.9Y¯ Ri if Y¯
R
i ≤ 0.3Y¯
0.27 + 0.32
(
Y¯ Ri − 0.3
)
if 0.3Y¯ < Y¯ Ri ≤ 2Y¯
0.81 + 0.15
(
Y¯ Ri − 2
)
if 2Y¯ < Y¯ Ri ≤ 4.1Y¯
1.13Y¯ if 4.1Y¯ < Y¯ Ri
,(3.13)
where
Y¯ Ri =
1
Tw
Tw∑
t=1
Yit
8For computational purposes, I follow Guvenen and Smith (2014) and estimate average
labor earnings Y¯ Ri as the fitted value of
Y¯i = ao + a1Yi,TR ,
where Y¯i is the simulated individual average earnings and Yi,TR is income at retirement age.
This avoids having to keep track of average earnings at each age.
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Recursive problem of a working household. For ages t = 1, · · · , Tr − 1
Vt(at, dt, zt) = max
ct,dt+1,at+1
{u(ct, st) + βEtVt+1(at+1, dt+1; zt)}
s.t. ct + at+1 + dt+1 +A(dt, dt+1) = Yt + (1 + r)at + (1− δ)dt
Yt given by equations (3.3)− (3.7)
at+1 ≥ −λyyt − λddt+1, ct ≥ 0
Recursive problem of a retiree household. For ages t = Tr, · · · , T
Vt(at, dt, zt) = max
ct,dt+1,at+1
{u(ct, st) + βξtEtVt+1(at+1, dt+1; zt)}
s.t. ct +
ζt
ζt+1
at+1 + dt+1 +A(dt, dt+1) = P (Y¯ ) + (1 + r)at + (1− δ)dt
P (Y¯ ) given by equation (3.13)
at+1 ≥ −λyyt − λddt+1, ct ≥ 0
VT+1 = 0
Solution
I solve the model numerically, proceeding by backward induction and using the
Endogenous Grid Method (Carroll, 2006; Barillas and Fernández-Villaverde,
2007). I apply the variant of the method developed in Fella (2014) to solve
for the value and policy functions of both the continuous consumption-savings
choice and the discrete decision of upgrading, downgrading, or not adjusting
the stock of durables. Because my solution algorithm is an application of Fella
(2014) in a life-cycle environment, I relegate the details to Appendix B.2.
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3.3.2 Calibration
One period in the model is one year of life. The first period corresponds to age
25, retirement happens at age 60, and everybody dies at age 95, that implies
TR = 35 and T = 70. For the parametrization, I proceed in two steps: First, I
estimate the income process characterized in equations (3.3)-(3.7) using Simu-
lated Method of Moments. The targets are primarily second and higher order
moments of the distributions of four-year income changes, as well as life-cycle
restrictions on the level of income. The complete list is provided in Table IV.
Second, to parametrize the rest of the model, I externally measure a subset
of the parameters that have straightforward data counterparts or reliable evi-
dence and then calibrate the remaining to target moments of the cross-sectional
distribution of nondurable and durable consumption.
Estimation of the Income Process with SMM
I use Simulated Method of Moments to estimate the parameters controlling the
dynamics of the stochastic income component Θy, which include:
Θy ≡ {p, ρ, µ1, σ1, σ2, σε, σz0}
I make the assumption that µ2 =
−(1−p)
p µ1, which simply makes sure the mean
of ∆y is zero. This assumption allows the method of moments to focus on
targeting higher-order moments without much loss, since matching the average
of changes is relatively easy.
The targeted moments include the variance and higher-order moments of
four-year income changes, as well as the life cycle profile of the variance of
income levels. Targeting the life-cycle profile of the variance of income levels is
important to discipline the persistence parameter.
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Table IV: Income Process Estimates
σε (Variance of transitory shock) 0.053
p (Probability of drawing from normal 1) 0.930
ρ (Persistence) 0.913
µ1 (Mean of 1 persistent shock) 0.008
µ2 (Mean of 2 persistent shock) -0.106
σ1 (Variance of 1 persistent shock) 0.075
σ2 (Variance of 2 persistent shock) 1.189
σz0 (Variance of initial distribution) 0.753
.
Externally Calibrated Parameters
Preferences. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is fixed at γ = 2.
Utility. The interest rate is fixed at r = 4%, based on empirical evidence on
the risk-free rate of U.S. Treasury Bonds in McGrattan and Prescott (2000)9.
Given, the choice for r, I then calibrate β to target the empirical value for the
median wealth to median income ratio of households, which is equal to 1.35.
Share of nondurables in total consumptions. Given the Cobb-Douglass
specification chosen for the consumption bundle, I measure α as the share of
nondurable goods in total consumption in my household sample. This parameter
is often found to be around 0.8 (Luengo-Prado, 2006) or even larger (Berger
and Vavra, 2015). I find it to be closer to 0.7, given the consumption categories
included in my benchmark sample. Table V includes the different values for
typically used definitions of nondurable consumption.
94% is also around the average of the values used in related literature. I test robustness
to changing this value to r = 3%, as in Kaplan and Violante (2010), and r = 5%, as in Berger
and Vavra (2015).
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α
D = Cars + Houses + Furnishings + Repairs + Clothing
C1 = Food + Utilities + Nondurable Transportation + Recreation 0.7039
C2 = C1+ Rent 0.7249
C3 = C2+ Health + Education + Child Care 0.8034
Table V: Share of Nondurable Consumption in Total Consumption
Depreciation of durable goods. To calculate the depreciation rate of durables,
I use data from the BEA’s NIPA and Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable
Goods. In particular, I compute a weighted average of the depreciation for
stock of durables and housing, where the weights are given by the relative size
of each group. This gives an annual depreciation rate of δ = 0.072.
Service flow of durable goods. The flow of services derived from the stock
of durable consumption, κ, is similarly calculated using aggregate data from the
Flow of Funds and the BEA. It is measure to be κ = 0.035. This is, a car worth
$10000 provides yearly services for the value of $350.
Survival Probabilities. Conditional survival probabilities from the U.S. Life
Tables.
Deterministic age profile. This series is obtained as the predicted value of a
regression of income after transfers on a quadratic on age and a set of education
and year dummies.
Initial distribution of assets and durables. Distribution of assets and
durables, relative to income in the sample, respectively.
Internally Calibrated Parameters
To calibrate the remaining parameters behind the accumulation of durables and
liquid assets, namely the share of durables that can be used as a collateral
and the adjustment cost parameter, I do a second SMM to target moments of
consumption changes.
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Table VI: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Value Target Data Model
β (Discount factor) 0.976 Median W/Y 1.35 1.48
λd (Collateralized borrowing) 0.720
χ (Adjustment costs parameter) 0.078
.
3.4 Results
In this section, I first evaluate the performance of the model in replicating the
tail behavior described in the empirical section, as well as the mechanisms at
work. Next, I measure to what extent income shocks pass-through to consump-
tion, comparing with previous estimates in the literature. A novel component of
my analysis is that, instead of calculating the OLS response, I estimate quantile
regressions to obtain heterogeneous effects by the size of the shock. I conclude
with a welfare calculation.
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Higher-order moments in the model
Table VII: Model Fit
Data Model
Cross-sectional moments (Income)
SD(log∆2ypostt ) 0.585 0.589
KS(log∆2ypostt ) -0.055 -0.005
CS(log∆2ypostt ) 6.890 6.711
SD(log∆4ypostt ) 0.660 0.532
KS(log∆4ypostt ) -.086 -.113
CS(log∆4ypostt ) 5.921 6.010
var(ypostt ) See fig. ??
Cross-sectional moments (Consumption)
SD(log∆2ct) 0.481 0.211
SD(log∆2dt) 0.813 0.903
CS(log∆2ct) 3.523 2.822
CS(log∆2dt) 23.687 30.687
SD(log∆4ct) 0.530 0.519
SD(log∆4dt) 1.004 1.192
CS(log∆4ct) 3.375 3.002
CS(log∆4dt) 16.836 18.281
Non-targeted model implications
% Households adjusting/year 15.212% 16.942%
% Households upgrading/year 8.028% 10.102%
% Households downgrading/year 7.084% 6.840%
Note: Names in bold are targeted. Abbreviations: SD - standard deviation, KS - Kelley
Skewness, CS - Crow-Siddiqui Kurtosis.
Lumpiness and deviations from normality
Figure 3.3 shows the model counterpart of Figure 3.1. Besides replicating the
data well, it is interesting to notice the behavior of durables adjustment. Coming
from the model with durable adjustments, it is easy to see how the lumpiness
translates into the QQ plot. With the intermediate quantiles all equal to zero.
In other words, households only downgrade their durables when they receive
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a tail shock. It is interesting to see that there is some asymmetry between
positive and negative changes, with the negative side being more lumpy. This is
because of depreciation and semi-durable purchases. While the only reason why
a household would downgrade their stock of durables, on top of age effects which
are removed from this picture, is because of an income shock, households may
choose to repair their current home or upgrade to a new one due to depreciation.
Figure 3.3: Deviations from Normality: Durables vs. Nondurables
3.4.1 Tail risk and Partial Insurance
Traditional measures of pass-through have realied on covariances between changes
in income and consumption. Specifically:
φc,η =
Cov (∆ct, ηt)
Var (ηt)
,
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where η here stands for the persistent shock in the case of my structural model.
An empirical measure can be obtained by instrumenting η with a function of
income changes in the data.
These measures have proven to be informative about the amount of insurance
on top of self-insurance under certain linearity assumptions. They provide,
however, a limited measure of partial insurance when income changes deviate
from the standard case. In particular, two are the limitations that are crucial
for my analysis: First, φc,η is a relative measure of the impact of the shock since
it is divided by the variance. That is, even if we were to limit risk to second
order variation, the size of the shock is irrelevant. Second, when higher-order
moments of income shocks are nontrivial, the empirical analysis has shown that
covariances can be misleading to represent the joint dynamics at the tails.
For comparison with the literature, and to gain insights on the effects of
Non-Gaussian shocks and durable consumption, I first report the φ coefficients:
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I will comment on the estimates for the persistent component, as the tran-
sitory component is highly insurable. It is interesting to notice that the non-
Gaussian case exhibits a larger degree of self-insurance than the Gaussian case.
Moreover, considering durable adjustments reduces the amount of partial insur-
ance. However, as I have mentioned above, these estimates have to be inter-
preted with caution in the presence of very large shocks, as the average effect
does not necessarily coincide with the behavior at the tails. Overall, this pro-
vides a second check on the fit of the model, since the estimates for models
without nondurables are strongly consistent with previous literature, namely
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Kaplan and Violante (2010) and Guvenen et al. (2016) for the Gaussian and
Non-gaussian case, respectively.
To complement the analysis and overcome the limitations present in covari-
ane measures, I calculate empirical impulse response functions to different sizes
of income shocks.
Figure 3.4: Response to Income Shocks of Different Size
(a) Nondurables (b) Durables
The x-axis shows 20 percentiles of the income changes distribution. The
y-axis contains the average response to this size of shock. The different lines
correspond to different horizons, from 1 to 10 years ahead.
Notice that these figures are consistent with the idea that, in the event of
large shocks, households adjust their durable stock in an unproportionate size.
Moreover, the negative effect on consumption from negative income shocks fol-
lows a U-shape in the negative quadrant, getting closer to zero as the size of
the durable adjustment increases. This effect is stronger the longer the horizon.
Again, notice how the upward changes do not feature this result. This coin-
cides with the lack of upper tail dependence between durable consumption and
earnings.
3.5 Conclusions
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I have documented
that extreme changes in household income are more pervasive in the data than
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usually assumed in parametric assumptions. In particular, I show that excess
kurtosis is not an exclusive feature of individual earnings that fades out when
transfers are considered. On the contrary, all three of households earnings,
nondurable consumption, and durable consumption growth exhibit deviations
from log-normality, especially the latter. This is surprising, as one would expect
most of the large changes to go away with the inclusion of both spouses’ income
and, especially, of government transfers.
To gain insight on the join distribution of consumption and income, I have
defined new measures of comovement between earnings and consumption changes
that are borrowed from the finance literature, where the analysis of tails is typ-
ical. While the overall covariance between earnings and nondurables is con-
siderably higher than for durables, empirical measures of tail dependence show
that the opposite is true for the case of extreme events. That is, earnings and
nondurable consumption are correlated, but less so in the tails. The opposite
happens for durable consumption.
I estimated a quantitative model where non-convex adjustment costs in
durable adjustments can endogenously generate fat tails in durable consump-
tion. I test the implications of the model for usual estimates of partial insurance
and find that they are indeed very similar, and slightly smaller than in the gen-
eral case. This would be surprising if it weren’t for the fact that there is a large
amount of heterogeneity in the size of the shock. Inspecting the responses of
consumption change on the structural income shocks show that there is a sub-
stantial response to extreme negative shocks, especially of durable consumption.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
This appendix briefly describes the variables used for each of the data sets
and lists the numbers of observations after the sample selection steps.
A.1.1 PSID
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. We identify current heads and spouses
as those individuals within the family unite with Sequence Number equal to 1
and 2, respectively. In the PSID, the man is labelled as the household head and
the woman as his spouse. Only when the household is headed by a woman alone,
she is considered the head. If the family is a split-off family from a sampled
family, then a new head is selected.
Age. The age variable recorded in the PSID survey does not necessarily in-
crease by 1 from one year to the next. This may be perfectly correct, since the
survey date changes every year. For example, an individual can report being 20
years old in 1990, 20 in 1991, and 22 in 1992. We thus create a consistent age
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variable by taking the age reported in the first year that the individual appears
in the survey and add 1 to this variable in each subsequent year.
Education Level. In the PSID, the education variable is not reported every
year and it is sometimes inconsistent. To deal with this problem, we use the
highest education level that an individual ever reports as the education variable
for each year. Since our sample contains only individuals that are at least 25
years old, this procedure does not affect our education variable in a major way.
Income
Individual Male Wages and Salaries. This is the variable used for indi-
vidual income in the benchmark case. It is the answer to: How much did (Head)
earn altogether from wages or salaries in year t-1, that is, before anything was
deducted for taxes or other things? This is the most consistent earnings variable
over time reported in the PSID, as it has not suffered any redefinitions or change
in subcomponents1.
Individual Male Labor Earnings. Annual Total Labor Income includes
all income from wages and salaries, commissions, bonuses, overtime and the
labor part of self-employment (farm and business income). Self-employment in
PSID is split into asset and labor parts using a 50-50 rule in most cases. Because
this last component has been inconsistent over time2, we subtract the labor part
of business and farm income before 1993.
Individual Female Labor Earnings. There is no corresponding Wages and
Salaries variable for spouses. We use Wife Total Labor Income and follow
a similar procedure as in the case of heads.
1See Shin and Solon (2011) for a comparison of PSID male earnings variables in inequality
analyses.
2In particular, total labor earnings included the labor parts of farm and business income
up to the 1993 survey but not in subsequent waves.
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Annual Hours. For heads and wives, it is defined as the sum of annual hours
worked on main job, extra jobs and overtime. It is computed using usual hours
of work per week times the number of actual weeks worked in the last year.
Pre-Government Household Labor Earnings. Head and wife labor earn-
ings.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Pre-government house-
hold earnings minus taxes plus public transfers, as defined below.
Taxes. The PSID reports own estimates for total taxes until 1991. For the
remaining years, we estimate taxes using TAXSIM.
Public Transfers. Transfers are considered at the family unit level, when
possible. We group social and welfare programs in three broad categories. Due
to changes in the PSID design, the specific definition of each program is different
every year. We give an overview below and leave the specific replication details
for the online Data Appendix.
Household Disposable Income. We construct this variable from Household
Taxable Income (Head’s and wife’s income from assets, earnings, and net profit
from self-employment) minus taxes plus public transfers.
Transfers
We refer to Table V in the main text for a description of the three groups of
programs considered, as well as their subcomponents. In the PSID, obtaining
an annual amount of each type of benefits is almost wave-specific. Every few
survey years, the level of aggregation within the family unit and across welfare
programs is different for at least one of our groups. To impose some common
structure, we establish the following rules.
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For survey years 1970-19933 and 2005-2011, the total annual amount of each
program is reported for the head, spouse and others in the family unit. In
occasions, the amount appears combined for several or all members.4 Because
in those cases it is impossible to identify separate recipiency of each member, we
consider the benefit amount of the whole family. This is, we add up all available
information for all family members, whether combined or separately reported.
In survey years 1994-2003, most benefits (except Food Stamps and OASDI)
are reported separately for the head and the spouse only. The way amounts are
reported changes as well. First, the reported amount ($X) received is asked.
Second, the frequency of that amount ($X per year, per month, per week, etc)
is specified. We convert all amounts to a common frequency by constructing a
monthly amount $x using these time values. Finally, the head and spouse are
asked during which months the benefit was received. The final annual recipiency
of transfers is then obtained multiplying $x by the number of months this benefit
was received. For Food Stamps and OASDI, we follow the rules described for
the other waves.
Detailed Sample Selection
We start with an initial sample of 584,392 SRC individuals interviewed be-
tween 1976 and 2011. We then impose the next criteria every year. The number
of individuals kept at each stage in the sample selection is listed in Table I. Pre-
vious to this selection process, we have cleaned the raw data and corrected
duplicates and inconsistencies (for example, zero working hours with positive
labor income). We also require that the individuals have non top-coded obser-
vations in income.
3Our main sample refers to survey years 1977-2011, but complementary results are pro-
vided for the annual subsample of the PSID. This is, for 1970-1997. We drop the first two
waves in all cases, since benefits such as OASDI, UI and WC are only reported for the family
head; and benefits such as SSI are not reported at all.
4This is always the case for Food Stamps.
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1. The individual must be from the original main PSID sample (not from
the Survey of Economic Opportunities or Latino subsamples).
2. In the benchmark individual sample, we select male heads of family. In the
reference household sample, we require at least two adult members in the
unit and that individuals had no significant changes in family composition.
More specifically, we require that they responded either “no change” or
“change in family members other than the head or wife” to the question
about family composition changes.
3. The household must not have missing variables for the head or wife labor
income, or for education of the head. The individuals must not have
missing income or education themselves.
4. The individual must not have income observations that are outliers. An
outlier is defined as being in the top 1% of the corresponding year.
5. We require the income variable of analysis to be positive.
6. Household heads must be between 25 and 65 years old.
Table A.1: Number of Observations Kept in Each Step
Male Heads Households All Females
SRC 586,187 586,187 586,187
Family Composition 90,106 75,202 110,711
Non-Missing y or College 83,039 69,443 97,990
Positive Income 63,875 58,551 54,214
Outliers 63,065 57,262 53,257
Age Selection 54,593 50,102 45,330
Final #Obs for transitory changes 42,623 38,171 33,687
Final #Obs for persistent changes 34,985 30,985 27,269
Note: Table lists number of person-year, or household-year, obser-
vations in the three panels for the sample from PSID.
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A.1.2 LINDA
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. LINDA is compiled from the Income
Register based on filed tax reports and other registers. Statistics Sweden samples
individuals and then adds information for all family members, where family is
defined for tax purposes. This implies that there is no information about ’head
of households’. We therefore define the head of a household as the sampled
male.
Age. As defined by Statistics Sweden
Education Level. LINDA contains information about eduction from 1991
and onwards. An individual is assigned “college” education if it has at least 3
years of university education.
agraphPrivate / Public employment
An individual is defined as as working in the public sector, if he/she works in
public administration, health care or education. Linda contains consistent com-
parable information for the years 1991 and onwards. For the years 1991-92 the
public sector employment is defined as those we use SNI90 codes 72000-72003,
90000-93999 and >=96000. For 1993-2006 we use SNI92 codes 64110-64202,
73000-74110, 75000-92000, 92500-92530 and >=96000. For 2007 we use SNI2007
codes 64110-64202, 73000-74110, 75000-92000, 92500-92530 and >=96000.
Income
For the years 1985-2010 we use the measures suggested by Statistics Sweden
to be comparable between years in LINDA. We construct comparable measure
for the years 1979-1984.
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Individual labor earnings. Labor earnings consist of wages and salaries, the
part of business income reported as labor income, and taxable compensation for
sick leave and parental leave.
Pre-Government Household Labor Earnings. Defined as the sum of in-
dividual labor income within the family.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Post-government earn-
ings is calculated as pre-government earnings minus taxes plus public transfers.
Household Disposable Income. Disposable income consists of the sum of
factor income and minus taxes and plus public transfers.
Taxes. LINDA provides observations of total taxes paid by the individual.
Since taxed paid on capital income constitute a small part of total tax pay-
ments, and since we cannot separate taxes on capital income from those on
labor income, we assume that all taxes are labor income taxes.
Public Transfers. LINDA provides observations of total public transfers at
the individual level (Statistics Sweden has individualized transfers given to fam-
ilies) and at the household level. We also consider three subcategories of transfer
as listed below.
Transfers
Transfers in subcategory 1 and 3 are individual level transfers. Transfers in
subcategory 2 are family level transfers but have been individualized by Statis-
tics Sweden. For each subcategory, we take all transfers received by all members
of the households.
• HH-level transfers subcategory 1 (labor market transfers): sum of unem-
ployment benefits received by all members of household.
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• HH-level transfers subcategory 2 (family aid): sum of transfers to support
families received by all members of household.
• HH-level transfers subcategory 3 (pensions): sum of old-age pensions re-
ceived by all members of household.
Detailed Sample Selection
To be included in the individual sample the individual has to be sampled
and between 25 and 60 years old. A family is included in the household sample
if the sampled individual is a man between 25 and 60 years old and there are
at least two members aged 25-60 in the family.
A.1.3 SIAB
We use the scientific use file SIAB-R7510 provided by the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB). The SIAB data from which the scientific use file
is constructed is a 2% random sample of all individuals covered by a dataset
called IEB. This data set is from four different sources, which can be identified
in the data. For construction of our sample we use earnings data stemming from
BeH (employee history) and transfer data from LeH (benefit recipient history).
Records in BeH are based on mandatory social security notifications from em-
ployers and hence cover individuals working in employment subject to social
security, which excludes civil servants, students and self-employed. A new spell
starts whenever there is a new notification, which happens when either a new
employment relationship changes, an ongoing contract is changed, or with the
start of a calendar year. BeH covers all workers subject to social security contri-
butions, which excludes civil servants, self-employed and students. For details
on the data set see vom Berge et al. (2013).
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Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. SIAB does not contain information on
households. We use only individual level data.
Age. Birth year is reported consistently in SIAB data.
Education Level. Each individual spell in SIAB contains information on the
highest degree of formal education as reported by the employer. In order to
construct a consistent measure of education we apply imputation rules proposed
by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
agraphPrivate / Public employment
An individual is defined as as working in the public sector, if he/she works
in public administration, health care or education. SIAB contains consistent
comparable information for all years of the sample. We use the classification
WZ93 as provided in the data, which aggregates 3 digit codes of the original
WZ93 classification into 14 categories. The industry of an employer is registered
once a year and assigned to the worker spells of that year. This implies that
for some individual spells there is no information on the industry. For each
year a worker is assigned the industry from the longest spell in that year. We
classify as public employment those in sectors 13 (3-digit WZ93 801-804, 851-
853: Education, social and health-care facilities) and 14 (751-753, 990: public
administration, social security).
Income
Individual labor earnings. We calculate annual earnings as the sum of to-
tal earning from all valid spells for each individual. As marginal employment
spells were not reported before 1999, we drop marginal employment in the years
where they are reported to obtain a time consistent measure. For the same
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reason we drop spells with reported average daily wage rate below the highest
marginal employment threshold in the sample period, which is 14.15 Euros (in
2003 Euros). There are two drawbacks in the available data: structural break
of the wage measure in 1984 and top-coding.
Structural break in wage measure Since 1984 the reported average daily
wage rate from an employment spell includes one-time payments. We correct
for this structural break following a procedure based on Dustmann et al. (2009):
we rank individuals from 1976 to 1983 into 50 quintiles of the annual full-time
wage distributions. Then we fit locally weighted regressions of the wage growth
rate from 1982-1983 on the quintiles in 1983 and the same for 1983-1984. We
then define as the correction factor the difference between the quintile-specific
smoothed value of wage growth between 1984 and 1983. The underlying as-
sumption is that wage growth should be higher from 1983-1984 because the
wage measure includes one-time payments. In order to control for overall wage
growth differences we subtract the average of the correction factor of the sec-
ond to 20th quintiles. The resulting percentile-specific correction factor is then
applied to wages in 1976-1983.
Imputation of top-coded wages Before aggregating earnings from all spells
we correct full-time wage spells for the top-coding. We therefore follow Daly
et al. (2014) and fit a Pareto tail to the cross-sectional wage distribution. The
Pareto distribution is estimated separately for each year by age-group and sex.
We define seven age groups: 25-29,30-34,...,55-60. As starting point for the
Pareto we choose the 60th percentile of the subgroup-specific distribution. As
in Daly et al. (2014), we draw one random number by individual which we then
apply to the annual specific distributions when assigning a wage to the top-
coded workers. We apply the imputation method to the annual distribution of
average full-time wages and hence an individual can be below the cutoff limit
if, e.g., from two full-time spells in a year only one is top-coded. We therefore
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define as top-coding limit the annual specific limit minus 3 DM (1995 DM) as
in Dustmann et al. (2009).
Transfers
In SIAB we observe consistently over time unemployment benefits at the
individual level.
Detailed Sample Selection
To be included in the sample the individual has to be between 25 and 60
years old and earn a gross income above 520*0.5*minimum wage. We drop all
workers which have at least one spell reported in East Germany.
SOEP
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. For each individual in the sample, SOEP
reports the relationship to the head of household in any given wave. Whenever
there is a non-couple household, i.e., no spouse is reported, the reported head
is classified as head. Whenever we observe a couple household and the reported
head is a male we keep this; when the reported head is a female and the reported
spouse is a male, we reclassify the male to be head and the female to be spouse.
Age. The age is measured by subtracting year of birth from the current year.
Education Level. The education variable used categorizes the obtained max-
imum education level by ISCED 1997. An individual with category 6 is assigned
“college” education, an individual with categories 1-5 is assigned “non-college”.
Category 6 includes a degree obtained from university, from technical college,
from a university abroad, and a PhD. An individual still in school (category 0)
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is assigned a missing. For a small number of individuals the described proce-
dure yields inconsistencies in the sense that for some year t the assignment is
“college” and some later year t+s the assignment is “non-college”; in these cases
we assign “college” to the later year.
Income and Hours
Individual labor income. Labor earnings are calculated from individual
labor income components and includes income from first job, secondary job, 13th
and 14th salary, christmas bonus, holiday bonus, profit sharing. For consistency
with the PSID measure we assign 50% of income from self-employment to labor
income.
Household level labor income. Defined as the sum of individual labor in-
come of head and spouse.
Annual Hours. SOEP measures the average actual weekly hours worked and
the numbers of months an individual worked. From these measures SOEP pro-
vides a constructed measure of annual hours worked of an individual.
Pre-Government Household Labor Earnings. Head and spouse labor
earnings.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Pre-government house-
hold earnings minus taxes plus public transfers, as defined below.
Taxes. SOEP provides estimates of total taxes at the household level.
Public Transfers. Transfers are considered at the family unit level and at the
individual level. We group social and welfare programs in three broad categories
as listed below.
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Household Disposable Income. We construct this variable from Household
Taxable Income (Head’s and wife’s income from assets, earnings, and net profit
from self-employment) minus taxes plus public transfers. SOEP provides a
measure of household asset flows, which is calculated as income from renting
minus operating costs, plus dividend income.
Transfers
Transfers are partly observed at the individual level and partly at the house-
hold level. For each subcategory, we take all transfers received by all members
of the households.
• HH-level transfers: we use transfers received by all individual household
members in order to calculate measures that are consistent over time. For
each individual, total transfers are the sum of the following components:
old-age pensions, widow’s pensions, maternity benefit, student grants, un-
employment benefits, subsistence allowance, unemployment assistance (up
to 2004); at the hh-level we measure received child allowances and the to-
tal unemployment benefits II received by all household members (since
2005 replacing unemployment assistance).
• HH-level transfers subcategory 1 (labor market transfers): sum of unem-
ployment benefits received by all members of household.
• HH-level transfers subcategory 2 (family aid): sum of subsistence allowance
of all members, + sum of unemployment assistance received by all mem-
bers (up to 2004), + hh-level measure of unemployment benefits II (since
2005).
• HH-level transfers subcategory 3 (pensions): sum of old-age pensions re-
ceived by all members of household.
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Sample Selection
In order to be in the initial sample for a year, the individual or household
head must be between ages 25 and 60 and live in West Germany. In order to
have a consistent sample, we drop the immigrant subsample and the high income
subsample. This gives initial sample sizes of 87,582 individual-year observations
for the male sample, 76,249 individual-year observations for the female sample,
and 76,051 household-year observations for the household sample. The sample
selection then follows the steps listed below for each sample. All cross-sectional
statistics are calculated using appropriate cross-sectional individual or house-
hold weights, respectively.
1. drop if no info on education or if no degree obtained yet
2. drop if currently working in military
3. drop if no info on income
4. drop if no info on hours worked
5. keep if income > 0 and hours > 520
6. drop if in highest percentile (sample outliers)
7. drop if below 520*0.5*minimum wage, where minimum wage is set to be
6€ in year 2000 Euros
8. for transitory change measure: keep if in sample in t and t-1
9. for permanent change measure: keep if in sample in t and t-5
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Table A.2: Number of observations in the three panels after each selection step
selection step Male Heads Households All Females
initial 87,582 76,051 76,249
drop if no coll. info 86,737 75,310 75,270
drop if in military 86,712 75,293 75,268
drop if no obs on ymin 79,547 75,070 50,374
drop if no obs on hours 79,547 75,070 50,374
keep if >=520 hrs and ymin>0 77,265 71,389 42,245
drop top 1% of ymin per year 76,404 70,627 41,830
drop if ymin<.5*520*min wage 76,268 70,097 41,434
Final #Obs for transitory changes 64,572 59,209 31,612
Final #Obs for persistent changes 38,399 34,792 16,792
Note: Table lists number of person-year, or household-year, obser-
vations in the three panels for the sample from SOEP.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Data Appendix
This section describes the variables used in the analysis. The majority of the
analysis is done with PSID, so the description is more detailed for this dataset.
B.1.1 The PSID
Structure and weights
Four different household samples compose the current version of the PSID from
1968 to 2013: (1) the Survey Research Center (SRC), (2) the Survey of Economic
Opportunity (SEO), (3) the Latino sample, and (4) the Immigrant sample. The
SRC, usually referred to as core sample, corresponds to a representative sample
of the U.S. population in 1967 and their offsprings in later years. Most studies
based on the PSID use this subsample only. The SEO also begins with the first
available wave and included an additional set of low-income households. In 1990,
2000 Latino families were added and then dropped in 1995. Due to its short
span, this sample is rarely used. Finally, a nationally representative sample of
immigrant households that were not eligible in 1968 starts being surveyed in
1997.
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All of these samples are probability samples with equal weights. Their com-
bination, however, has unequal selection probabilities. I make use of the cross-
sectional weights for the core, SEO, and immigrant samples. I do not use the
Latino sample.
Variables
Head and Relationship to Head. I identify current heads and spouses as
those individuals within the family unite with Sequence Number equal to 1 and
2, respectively. In the PSID, the man is labelled as the household head and the
woman as his spouse. Only when the household is headed by a woman alone,
she is considered the head. If the family is a split-off family from a sampled
family, then a new head is selected.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Pre-government house-
hold earnings minus taxes plus public transfers, as defined below. I construct
an alternative version by subtracting household capital income from family
money (i.e. disposable income) and the correlation is 0.98.
Taxes. Federal and state labor income taxes after credits. Estimated using
TAXSIM.
Public Transfers. Transfers are considered at the family unit level, when
possible. Broadly, the transfers included are unemployment benefits, welfare,
and disability insurance. They are defined as in Busch et al. (2016), an extensive
discussion and specific description is given in their Data Appendix.
Pre-Government Household Earnings. Head and spouse earnings, with-
out self-employment.
Individual Head Labor Earnings. Annual Total Labor Income includes
all income from wages and salaries, commissions, bonuses, overtime> I remove
the labor part of self-employment (farm and business income)1.
Individual Spouse Labor Earnings. Same definition as head’s earnings
1Self-employment income is split between asset and labor income in a somewhat arbitrary
manner. See Shin and Solon (2011) for a detailed discussion.
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for the spouse.
Variables not used in the main analysis for sample selection or controls include:
Education Level. Highest education level that an individual ever reports.
Annual Hours. Sum of annual hours worked on main job, extra jobs and
overtime. It is computed using usual hours of work per week times the number
of actual weeks worked in the last year.
B.1.2 Detailed Sample Selection
I start with an initial sample of 105813 SRC and SEO households interviewed
between 1992 and 2012. We then impose the next criteria every year. The
number of individuals kept at each stage in the sample selection is listed in
Table I. Previous to this selection process, I have cleaned the raw data and
corrected duplicates. Outliers are considered bottom 0.2% and top 0.5% in
order to obtain distributions for 1 year income changes that resemble those in
Guvenen et al. (2016). See the next appendix section for a comparison with
their data.
Observations Remaining
Start with 105813
No Major HH Composition Changes 89349
No Retirees 76627
Nonmissing Main Variables 70903
Drop Inconsistent Y and H 70806
Income Outliers 67413
Age in 25,60 58751
Not reliable Y˜ 22373
Not enough consequtive obs 20954
Final # Observations 20954
Final # Households 4697
Table A.1: Detailed Sample Selection
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B.1.3 Detailed Summary Statistics and Extra Moments
Table A.2: Tails and Higher-Order Moments of Earnings and Consumption
Std. Dev. L9010 Skewness Kelley Sk. Kurtosis C-Siddiqui K. L9050 L5010
2-Year Changes
log ∆2yindt 0.654 0.875 -0.475 -0.045 20.926 9.899 0.418 0.457
Y 0.660 0.922 -0.355 -0.027 22.471 8.701 0.449 0.473
O 0.649 0.816 -0.587 -0.074 19.527 11.059 0.378 0.438
log ∆2yhht 0.571 0.846 -0.193 -0.043 24.045 7.018 0.405 0.441
Y 0.584 0.909 0.107 -0.048 25.110 6.542 0.433 0.476
O 0.559 0.793 -0.487 -0.040 22.852 7.444 0.380 0.412
log ∆2ypostt 0.585 0.760 -0.980 -0.055 43.711 6.890 0.359 0.401
Y 0.580 0.772 -0.026 -0.035 39.629 6.515 0.372 0.400
O 0.589 0.753 -1.763 -0.071 46.930 7.355 0.350 0.403
log ∆2ct 0.471 0.999 0.025 0.004 9.426 4.000 0.501 0.498
Y 0.488 1.007 -0.032 -0.002 10.729 4.141 0.502 0.505
O 0.455 0.987 0.077 0.006 7.874 3.937 0.496 0.491
log ∆2dt 0.813 0.771 0.829 0.447 16.164 23.687 0.558 0.213
Y 0.936 1.125 0.857 0.510 12.477 26.671 0.849 0.276
O 0.692 0.537 0.575 0.339 21.330 19.182 0.360 0.178
4-Year Changes
log ∆4yindt 0.725 1.082 -0.551 -0.126 19.349 8.151 0.473 0.609
Y 0.746 1.135 -0.822 -0.121 19.109 7.797 0.499 0.636
O 0.703 1.018 -0.237 -0.164 19.603 8.755 0.425 0.592
log ∆4yhht 0.632 1.044 -0.306 -0.095 21.097 5.838 0.473 0.572
Y 0.654 1.069 -0.456 -0.090 19.377 5.854 0.487 0.583
O 0.611 1.006 -0.119 -0.089 23.104 5.782 0.459 0.548
log ∆4ypostt 0.660 0.914 -1.297 -0.086 37.590 5.921 0.418 0.496
Y 0.683 0.910 -1.095 -0.079 32.716 5.974 0.419 0.491
O 0.636 0.918 -1.539 -0.092 43.565 5.827 0.417 0.501
log ∆4ct 0.514 1.107 -0.464 -0.041 10.883 3.796 0.531 0.576
Y 0.537 1.127 -0.942 -0.052 11.435 3.925 0.534 0.592
O 0.490 1.089 0.144 -0.032 10.032 3.775 0.527 0.562
log ∆4dt 1.004 1.235 0.824 0.451 10.885 16.836 0.896 0.339
Y 1.141 1.611 0.807 0.498 8.747 15.663 1.207 0.404
O 0.849 0.929 0.686 0.409 13.998 14.900 0.655 0.274
Note: Moments. Columns in dark gray denote the 2nd through 4th central moments of
the distribution of each variable. Columns in black are the corresponding robust and other
percentile-based measures. P9010 : 90th/10th percentiles, Kelley Sk.: Kelley Skewness (0
under a normal), C-Siddiqui K.: Crow-Siddiqui Kurtosis (2.91 under a normal), P9050 :
90th/50th percentiles, P5010 : 50th/10th percentiles. Variables. yind: individual earnings
(heads), yhh: household pre-gov. earnings, ypost: households post-gov. earnings, c: non-
durable consumption, d: durable consumption. See Section 3.2.1 for detailed definitions.
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics- Income
Moments
mean sd skewness kurtosis min max
Individual Labor Income - Males 68821.50 91776.56 12.37 279.95 0.00 3015425.75
Individual Labor Income - Females 35222.03 32104.80 2.55 17.55 0.00 370975.31
HH Pre-Government Labor Income 49437.46 56320.71 10.62 248.34 0.00 2038943.00
HH Post-Government Labor Income 41520.77 42060.71 1.41 355.23 -1.57e+06 1343660.38
Durable consumption 91908.48 124277.98 7.13 127.44 0.00 3786477.00
Non-durable consumption 14224.52 9455.32 3.41 36.67 0.00 187641.42
Semi-durable consumption 8246.56 15652.97 12.69 255.19 0.00 425631.84
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Individual Labor Income - Males 15638.53 31669.62 51727.05 81516.67 125709.75 168855.97
Individual Labor Income - Females 0.00 13232.61 30128.67 49186.45 71308.83 87944.59
HH Pre-Government Labor Income 7815.66 21668.51 39594.66 63260.14 93289.87 121559.35
HH Post-Government Labor Income 10822.88 21008.85 35789.11 53385.75 74759.59 94156.75
Durable consumption 1414.21 12322.44 65848.66 124733.64 200051.12 272782.53
Non-durable consumption 5314.89 8220.80 12316.20 17864.74 24844.35 30416.90
Semi-durable consumption 499.69 1952.96 4918.65 9793.83 17167.76 24674.76
Observations 23287
Comparison with SSA Data for Male Earnings
Figure A.1: U.S. Males Annual Earnings 1-Year Log-Changes: SSA vs. PSID
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Figure A.2: U.S. Males Annual Earnings 5-Year Log-Changes: SSA vs. PSID
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Understanding QQ Plots
Figure A.3: Understanding QQ Plots
(a) mu (b) sig (c) mix
Log-Densities
Graphs are truncated at +/- 3.
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2-Year Changes
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Figure A.4: Household Income (Pre-Gov and Post-Gov)
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Figure A.5: Consumption (Nondurable and Durable)
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4-Year Changes
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Lo
g 
De
ns
ity
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Lo
g 
De
ns
ity
Figure A.6: Household Income (Pre-Gov and Post-Gov)
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Figure A.7: Consumption (Nondurable and Durable)
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B.2 Numerical Appendix
B.2.1 Solution Details
Optimality Conditions (Euler Equation)
Recall the maximization problem solved by working households at each age
t = 1, · · · , Tr − 1:
Vt(at, dt, zt) = max
ct,dt+1,at+1
{u(ct, st) + βEtVt+1(at+1, dt+1; zt)} (B.1)
s.t. ct + at+1 = Yt + (1 + r)at + (1− δ)dt − dt+1 −A(dt, dt+1)(B.2)
Yt given by equations (3.3)− (3.7) (B.3)
at+1 ≥ −λyyt+1 − λddt+1, ct ≥ 0, dt+1 ∈ D (B.4)
To facilitate the solution of (B.1), I implement a set of transformations
described in the next paragraphs.
First, let
bt+1 ≡ at+1 + λyyt+1 + λddt+1. (B.5)
Then, the borrowing constraint can be rewritten as
ct + (bt+1 − λyyt+1 − λddt+1) = Yt + (1 + r)(bt − λyyt − λddt) + (1− δ)dt − dt+1 −A(dt, dt+1)
ct + bt+1 = Yt + (1 + r)bt + (1− δ)dt − (1− λd)dt+1 −A(dt, dt+1)− λd(1 + r)dt + λy(yt+1 − (1 + r)yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m(dt+1)
(B.6)
Notice that (B.6) defines a notion of cash in hand conditional on the choice of
durables. m(dt+1) denotes the total amount of resources available to be split
between (non-durable) consumption and savings.
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Next, I redefine V as follows
V˜t = max
ct,dt+1,at+1
C(ct, st)1−γ + βEtV˜ 1−γt+1 (at+1, dt+1; zt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vt

1
1−γ
,
which yields an equivalent problem while reducing the curvature of the value
function.
The dynamic programming problem to be solved is thus
V˜t(bt, dt, zt) = max
dt+1,bt+1
{
C(m(dt+1)− bt+1, st)1−γ + βEtV˜ 1−γt+1 (bt+1, dt+1; zt)
} 1
1−γ(B.7)
s.t. (bt+1, dt+1) ∈ {bt+1, dt+1 : bt+1 ∈ [0,m(dt+1; bt, at, zt)] , dt+1 ∈ D} .
The FOC therefore are given by
1
1− γV
1
1−γ−1
t
−(1− γ)(Ct)−γ
[
αcα−1t s
1−α
t
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cc,t≡ αct Ct
+β(1− γ)V˜ −γt+1V˜b,t+1
 = 0
C1−γt
α
ct
= βEtV˜ −γt+1V˜b,t+1 (FOCb)
And the envelope condition
(1− γ)V˜ −γt V˜b,t = (1− γ)(1 + r)C−γt Cc,t
V˜ −γt V˜b,t = (1 + r)C1−γt
α
ct
. (EC)
Combining (FOCb) and (EC), I obtain the usual Euler Equation:
C1−γt
α
ct
= β(1 + r)EtC1−γt+1
α
ct+1
(EE)
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Implementing the Endogenous grid Method
For a given choice of dt+1, (EE) can be inverted to write optimal consump-
tion ct as a function of next period’s assets and the income process specifics:
[
cαt s
1−α
t
]1−γ α
ct
= β(1 + r)EtC1−γt+1
α
ct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
EMUc,t+1
c
α(1−γ)
t s
(1−α)(1−γ)
t
α
ct
= EMUc,t+1
c
α(1−γ)−1
t =
EMUc,t+1
α
s
−(1−α)(1−γ)
t
ct =
[
EMUc,t+1
α
s
−(1−α)(1−γ)
t
] 1
α(1−γ)−1
(iEE)
B.2.2 Numerical Details and Calibration
I solve for the value and policy functions and each age using the method devel-
oped in Fella (2014) to apply the endogenous grid method with discrete choice
variables. Starting from VT+1 = 0, I proceed backwards. The retirement prob-
lem is deterministic. For the worker’s problem, I compute expected marginal
and continuation utilities using a Gauss-Kronrod integration application. Inter-
polation is always linear, due to the discrete jumps associated with the durable
decision. The size and bounds of the grids included in table A.4.
For the case of the income grid, the transitory shock is discretized using an
equally spaced grid. The persistent component z grid is also equally spaced and
the bounds are calculated via simulation of the income process. The bounds
for η are also chosen by simulation. The estimates are found using a standard
method of simulated moments, with weighting matrix that gives 0.8 weight to
all the cross-sectional moments and 0.2 to the variance life-cycle profile.
Concerning the calibration algorithm. For a given β, I find λd and χ by
simulating the economy until a criterium for the distance of the value function
is met (relative tolerance of 10−6). The algorithm used for both this and the
previous step is the global method MSLS from the NLOPt library. The local
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search is done with Nelder Mead, also the version in the same library.
Table A.4: Numerical Parameters
Value
Grids
na # Asset Grid Points 100
nd # Durable Grid Points 20
nz # Persistent Component Grid Points 41
nε # Transitory Component Grid Points 21
d, d¯ Bounds Durable Consumption 0,1000000
a, a¯ Bounds Assets 0,5000000
Power a Exponential Grid Power a 3
Power d Exponential Grid Power d 2
Nsim # Simulations 40000
